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On the optimal number of representatives

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Abstract

We propose a normative theory of the number of representatives based on a model of a representative democracy. We derive a formula giving the number of representatives as proportional to the square root of total population. Simple tests of the formula on a sample of a 100 countries yield good results. We then discuss the appropriateness of the number of representatives in some countries. It seems that the United States has too few representatives, while France and Italy have too many. The excess number of representatives matters: it is positively correlated with indicators of red tape and barriers to entrepreneurship.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. IDEI and ARQADE, Toulouse School of Economics, 21, Allee de Brienne, 31000, Toulouse, France

    Emmanuelle Auriol

  2. CREST, ENSAE, 15, boulevard Gabriel Peri, 92245, Malakoff, France

    Robert J. Gary-Bobo

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  1. Emmanuelle Auriol
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  2. Robert J. Gary-Bobo
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Correspondence to Robert J. Gary-Bobo.

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Auriol, E., Gary-Bobo, R.J. On the optimal number of representatives. Public Choice 153, 419–445 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9801-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9801-3

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