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A generalized Tullock contest

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Abstract

We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. This structure nests a number of existing contests in the literature and can be used to analyze new types of contests. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different types of contests and hence different equilibrium effort levels.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Economics, Centre for Competition Policy, and Centre for Behavioral and Experimental Social Science, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK

    Subhasish M. Chowdhury

  2. Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA, 92866, USA

    Roman M. Sheremeta

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  1. Subhasish M. Chowdhury
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  2. Roman M. Sheremeta
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Correspondence to Subhasish M. Chowdhury.

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Chowdhury, S.M., Sheremeta, R.M. A generalized Tullock contest. Public Choice 147, 413–420 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9636-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9636-3

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