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The function of morality

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Abstract

What is the function of morality? On this question, something approaching a consensus has recently emerged. Impressed by developments in evolutionary theory, many philosophers now tell us that the function of morality is to reduce social tensions, and to thereby enable a society to efficiently promote the well-being of its members. In this paper, I subject this consensus to rigorous scrutiny, arguing that the functional hypothesis in question is not well supported. In particular, I attack the supposed evidential relation between an evolutionary genealogy of morals and the functional hypothesis itself. I show that there are a great many functionally relevant discontinuities between our own culture and the culture within which morality allegedly emerged, and I argue that this seriously weakens the inference from morality’s evolutionary history to its present-day function.

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Notes

  1. For example, the evolutionary-psychological literature displays a strong tendency to simply equate morality with some form of altruism. See (De Waal 2013). Philip Kitcher is more cautious, including certain capacities for normative guidance along with characteristic emotional responses (Kitcher 2011, ch. 2).

  2. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this important observation.

  3. Interestingly, Richard Joyce claims that moral judgment is itself an essentially linguistic phenomenon. See (Joyce 2006a, b, p. 111).

  4. The method is very common, and it cuts across the so-called ‘analytic/continental’ divide in philosophy. See (Rousseau 1755; Nietzsche 1887; Foucault 1977; Williams 2002; Prinz 2007, ch. 6).

  5. Strictly speaking, Kitcher focuses on the notion of a design-explanation, but the result is effectively the same, since explanations which cite a kind of design point to selective pressures which ensure that only entities with certain dispositions survive. For criticism of the etiological model see (Cummins 1975).

  6. See (Owen 2010; Williams 2002) for this interpretation of Hume.

  7. I say modern Western community because I want to flag that the answer to this may vary from society to society. It is possible that other extant human societies will come closer to satisfying (Continuity), though probably not much closer.

  8. One might worry that I am putting words in Joyce’s mouth, here, but since Joyce does not spell out his initial conditions, I can only speculate. Moreover, if he has different initial conditions in mind, my bet is that they will also be notably absent from contemporary societies.

  9. I thank Pekka Väyrynen for this suggestion.

  10. Jason Garson gives an illustrative example: “plant species of the genus Dalechampia probably first used resin secretions as a defense against herbivores; later, they became used as a reward system for pollinators” (Garson 2008). See also (Millikan 1984, p. 32).

  11. In fairness to Kitcher, he acknowledges the possibility of what he labels “functional generation” (Kitcher 2011, pp. 237–242). Yet, so far as I can tell, he simply assumes, a priori, that subsequently generated functions must be systematically related to what he calls the original function of ethical practice. In other words, he rules out a certain form of exaptation by fiat.

  12. For notable exceptions to this rule, see (Nichols 2002; Prinz 2007).

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    Nicholas Smyth

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Smyth, N. The function of morality. Philos Stud 174, 1127–1144 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0746-8

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