Abstract
Many meta-ethicists have thought that rationality requires us to heed apparent normative reasons, not objective normative reasons. But what are apparent reasons? There are two kinds of standard answers. On de dicto views, R is an apparent reason for S to \(\phi \) when it appears to S that R is an objective reason to \(\phi \). On de re views, R is an apparent reason for S to \(\phi \) when (i) R’s truth would constitute an objective reason for S to \(\phi \), and (ii) it appears to S that R. De re views are currently more popular because they avoid overintellectualizing rationality. But they face problems owing to the way in which they do so. Some assume that we can escape these problems by requiring more information to be apparent or by appealing to defeat. But these strategies fail. So, I defend a new view: apparent reasons are apparent facts that agents are competently attracted to treat like objective reasons, where competence is indirectly defined in terms of objective reasons and a competence/performance distinction is honored. Since one can treat X like an F without having the concept of an F, the view does not overintellectualize rationality. But it is also strong enough to dodge the pitfalls of de re views.
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Notes
Might it be claimed that while infants, toddlers and animals lack the concept of a normative reason, they have a related proto-concept? Isn’t it plausible that even infants can believe that certain considerations count in favor? The concept of favoring may seem less sophisticated. But note that it is a relational concept: considerations count in favor of attitudes and acts. For us to explain the rationality of their beliefs, desires, etc., on the revised de dicto view, children must not only have the concept of favoring, but also the concepts of these attitudes. One cannot view the incomplete content \(\langle \)R counts in favor\(\rangle \) as the relevant object of children’s thoughts and seemings. The content would have the form \(\langle \)R counts in favor of \(\phi \hbox {-ing}\rangle \), where \(\phi \hbox {-ing}\) could be believing, desiring, etc. Yet it is even more doubtful that infants and some toddlers have these mental state concepts. Many animals certainly lack them. So a problem remains.
When it comes to stating his epistemological views, Schroeder abandons the belief-relative formulation and requires only that R be the content of some presentational mental state. See Schroeder (2011).
Schroeder (2011) addresses that standard objection, but not the one at issue here.
Schroeder (2007, Ms) calls this the ‘negative existential reasons fallacy’. I agree that it is a fallacy. I just do not see how this fallacy is driving the present argument. I also do not see how Schroeder’s usual strategy for explaining away the negative existential reasons intuition works here.
Why ‘all/most’ rather than ‘some’? My reason for imposing this stronger requirement is to get the right results in cases of supposition and pretense.
‘Is attracted to \(\phi \)’ just means ‘is disposed to feel the pull to \(\phi \)’. It can sound odd to use talk of attraction in the context of sociopaths and morality. But given what the language means, this is no objection.
“But can’t it be apparent to sociopaths that what they are doing is morally wrong?” Of course. But CAT doesn’t imply otherwise. What it implies is that the appearance that something is morally wrong fails to give the sociopath an apparent normative reason. What is apparently immoral needn’t be equally apparently disfavored by objective reasons. Morality may seem to the sociopath just like etiquette seems to the enlightened. Indeed, even in the more substantive sense of ‘rational’ that falls in between coherence and correctness, it sounds false to deem sociopaths irrational (CAT’s predictions here are plausible).
Some might wonder whether there will always be broader patterns of good reasoning to which we can appeal. But I have not assumed that there always will be broader patterns. I have only assumed that when there are broader patterns, the subject must be competent with some of them. Sure, not every good piece of reasoning will be subsumed by some interesting broader pattern. But it would be implausible to deny that there are ever any interesting broader patterns. When there are, competence requires proficiency with some of them. How else can we explain what Weirdo was missing, for example? Nevertheless, if one is a particularist, one could still embrace the core of my view. A particularist may say that there is no solution to the generality problem for CAT. But the particularist can insist that the apparent problem is not a problem at all but rather an illustration of a deep fact about competent reasoning.
Some—e.g., Jacob Ross—claim that some cases would be impossible to explain if objective notions were the sole fundamental normative notions. Consider:
Three Envelopes. Chester can choose one of three envelopes. He is correctly told by a reliable informant that there is $800 in Envelope 1. He is also correctly told there is $1000 in either Envelope 2 or 3, and that the envelope that lacks it is empty. But he cannot learn anything else about which might contain it (and knows this). (From Ross 2012)
Chester ought rationally to pick Envelope 1. But Chester can know that there is more objective reason for him to do otherwise. For he can know that either (i) there is more objective reason to choose Envelope 2 or (ii) that there is more objective reason to choose Envelope 3. After all, there is $200 more in one of them.
But this case does not undermine any theory of apparent reasons I’ve discussed. It does show that it can be possible that (i) one subjectively ought to \(\phi \) while (ii) it does not appear to one that one objectively ought to \(\phi \). But we have only discussed theories about what it is for a consideration to be an apparent normative reason to \(\phi \). They are not theories about the comparative weight of apparent reasons. And there are ways of weighing apparent reasons that (i) preserve the thought that all apparent reasons are apparently objective, but also (ii) affirm that there is sufficient apparent reason for Chester to choose Envelope 1.
A natural thought is that one has sufficient apparent reasons to \(\phi \) iff (a) one has an apparent reason to \(\phi \) and (b) one has no stronger apparent reason that favors a specific alternative to \(\phi \)-ing. Chester has an apparent objective reason to choose Envelope 1. $800 is a lot of money. There is no apparent fact that favors a specific alternative. While it is apparent that there is $200 more in one of the envelopes, it is not apparent which contains the extra money. So, my view is consistent with the intuitive verdict about this case.
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Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Selim Berker, Ruth Chang, Alvin Goldman, Doug Husak, Stephanie Leary, Errol Lord, Conor McHugh, Derek Parfit, T. M. Scanlon, Susanna Schellenberg, Holly Smith, Ernest Sosa, Lee Walters, Jonathan Way, Daniel Whiting, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments, as well as audiences at Harvard University, the University of Edinburgh, and the University of Southampton.
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Sylvan, K. What apparent reasons appear to be. Philos Stud 172, 587–606 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0320-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0320-1