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Strong necessities and the mind–body problem: a reply

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Notes

  1. On p. 153 of TCC, I say “it is worth noting that (contrary to a common supposition) the assumption that Q has the same primary and secondary intensions is not necessary for the argument ... to go through.” The current discussion reveals that this observation was a little quick. The argument requires that the canonical non-indexical expressions used to define two-dimensional intensions are super-rigid and therefore have the same primary and secondary intensions (without this, the domains of primary and secondary intensions will not be properly aligned, as discussed in excursus 10 of Constructing the World). So it must be that either phenomenal expressions are super-rigid or phenomenal truths are scrutable from truths involving super-rigid expressions. Fortunately this is a plausible assumption.

  2. For discussion of some related further issues concerning de re modality, see footnote 3 on pp. 188–189 of TCC.

  3. What exactly are the relations among the among the microphenomenal states, the atomic macrophenomenal states, and the total macrophenomenal state? It may be tempting to construe both microphenomenal states and the atomic states as parts of the total state, then one will have part-whole priority relations going in two directions at once, which may lead to trouble. One could perhaps suggest that there are two different part-whole relations involved here. But I think it is probably best to say that the microphenomenal-macrophenomenal relation is a grounding relation that is not a part-whole relation. Thanks to Geoff Lee for discussion here.

References

  • Chalmers, D. J. (2010). The character of consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.

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  • Levine, J. (2010). The Q factor: Modal rationalism versus modal autonomism. Philosophical Review,119, 365–380.

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  • Schaffer, J. (2010). Monism: The priority of the whole. Philosophical Review, 119, 31–76.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, New York University, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY, 10003, USA

    David J. Chalmers

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  1. David J. Chalmers
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Correspondence to David J. Chalmers.

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Thanks to Philip Goff, Geoff Lee, and Joe Levine for comments.

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Chalmers, D.J. Strong necessities and the mind–body problem: a reply. Philos Stud 167, 785–800 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0194-7

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