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Heidegger in the machine: the difference between techne and mechane

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Abstract

Machines are often employed in Heidegger’s philosophy as instances to illustrate specific features of modern technology. But what is it about machines that allows them to fulfill this role? This essay argues there is a unique ontological force to the machine that can be understood when looking at distinctions between techne and mechane in ancient Greek sources and applying these distinctions to a reading of Heidegger’s early thought on equipment and later thought on poiesis. Especially with respect to Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle’s conception of dunamis (capacity, power, force, potential), it becomes apparent from a Heideggerian perspective that machines provide an increase in capacity to its human users, but only so at a cost. This cost involves a problem of knowledge where the set of operations required in machine use results in the loss of understanding our dependency on being. The essay then concludes with a discussion of how this relation to machinic capacity is not merely pessimistic and deterministic, but indicates what might constitute a free relation to machines.

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Notes

  1. Since my thesis is specifically focused on understanding the ontology of the machine, I do not discuss thematically Gestell and Machenschaft since they relate to a larger context of ontological understanding. I develop a conception of machines according to their externalizing force as opposed to their makeability or representation of being. For a discussion of Gestell and Machenschaft and how they figure differently in Heidegger’s thought, see Lagdameo (2014). Suffice it to say, there are no doubt connections between what I argue is the ontological force of machines and the withdrawal of Being. I address this obliquely in terms of cost, passivity, and what a free relation to machines might involve.

  2. For an account of dunamis, see Sallis (1996: pp. 494–500) and Brogan (2005: pp. 100–141).

  3. Heidegger (1992: pp. 80–81, 85–86). Cf. his comments on the machine and feedback (1998b: pp. 140–141).

  4. For clarification on this matter, see Scharff (2011). My thanks to Robert Scharff for providing an earlier version of this article in English.

  5. For a critical study of technology and capacity in relation to Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self, see Lewin (2012). While my analysis is indebted to some of the substantial points Lewin makes about the technical interface and the reduction of human capacity, my approach differs in that I look specifically at the machine, which need not be technologically elaborate. As well, I see machinic capacity as productive, even if problematic, whereas the technical interface opposes ontological disclosure.

  6. Cf. Raffoul (1998: p. 230).

  7. There are some similarities between my use of cost and Bernard Stiegler’s characterization of technics as pharmaka, especially when he notes that “all exteriorisation leads to the possibility, not only for knowledge but for power” (Stiegler 2012: p. 12; emphasis in original). However, my use of externalization and cost were developed separately from Stiegler. Suffice it to say that my analysis should distinguish how I see technology, and not techne, involved in externalization and cost. Stiegler does not make such distinctions. There is also a further question as to how literally forms of technics can be described as pharmaka. Writing is an antidote for forgetfulness, which is involved in an essential activity of the soul for Plato. In general, technics are not remedies to illnesses or disharmonies but attempts to produce in a different manner.

  8. See Nussbaum (2001: pp. 95–96) and Roochnik (1996).

  9. For all references to Greek texts from which the line numbering was taken, please see the bibliography. English translations consulted are noted by date in parentheses. Homer, The Iliad (1924) XI.695 and The Odyssey (1919) IV.207 and XXII.433.

  10. Hesiod, Theogony (1914) line 146 and Herodotus, The Histories (1920) I.ix.sec1 and I.xxi.sec 1. See also Xenophon’s Memorabilia (Xenophon 1923) IV.vii.6 when speaking of Socrates’ view of divine creations; Plutarch’s Pericles (1916) XI.sec 4 on the designs of Pericles; and Epictetus’ Against the Academics (Epictetus 1890) I.v. on contriving to avoid the death of the body.

  11. Respectively: Homer, Odyssey, XVI.196; Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes (1926) 1038; and Epictetus, Of Personal Adornment (1890) III.1.

  12. Republic (2007) IV.430a, V.460d, VII.519e, respectively. See also, The Laws (1920) V.739c where the contrivance of the community, in which friends have all things in common, is a model taken to be a necessary constituent of the just polis.

  13. See Sallis’s (1996: chapter 5, especially p. 389) discussion of the characters in the Republic.

  14. Republic, VI.510b.

  15. Republic, VII.514a.

  16. Republic, 266b.

  17. Cratylus (1921) 408a. On speech and contrivance, see also, Herodotus where “Etearchus was persuaded by his wife and contrived [emechanato] a great sin against his daughter”; The Histories, IV.154.sec 2.

  18. Phaedrus (2003) 261a.

  19. See Phaedrus, 260a: “Nor does he [an orator] have to learn what is truly good or beautiful but only what seems so; persuading comes from this, not from the truth.”

  20. Poetics (1987) 1454a37–54b5.

  21. Poetics, 1450a16–20. On the meaning of Aristotle’s use of the term “universal” (katholou), see Heath (1991: p. 390): “Universality, then, is realised proximately in the necessity or probability of each character’s words and deeds, but ultimately in the necessity or probability of the product of their interaction, that is, in the necessary or probable consequence of the events which constitute the action as a whole. This is not to say, as some have supposed, that tragedy imitates universals.”

  22. Metaphysics, 985a13–18. The specific use of mechane follows directly after the lines quoted above when Aristotle refers to Anaxagoras who uses a makeshift contrivance to arrive at order.

  23. See, for example, Foltz (1995), Malpas (1999), and Mei (forthcoming).

  24. Blattner (1992: p. 115). It is only fair to point out that Blattner is interested in what kinds of dependence can make sense of Heidegger’s analysis, not necessarily what Heidegger himself wanted to argue.

  25. Blattner (1992: pp. 114–115).

  26. Heidegger (1962: pp. 98/69).

  27. McNeill (2005: pp. 95–97) discusses Heidegger’s distinction; however, in an attempt to distinguish Heidegger from Aristotle, he mistakenly attributes a strictly ethical–political conception of praxis to Aristotle (p. 101). This is not the case as Aristotle sees contemplation as the highest form of praxis. See, for example, Aristotle (2002) 1177b1–4.

  28. Heidegger (1962: pp. 98/69, 100/70–71, 1997: pp. 28–29). Cf. Hanley (2000: p. 163). For an analysis of this see, Mei (2009: pp. 60–69, 95–99).

  29. Cf. Hanley (2000: pp. 171–72) on praxis. See below on phronesis which is the knowledge specific to praxis.

  30. See, for example, Aristotle, Physics (1963) 201b30–3.

  31. Heidegger (1962: pp. 68/97, 99/70). On the relation between praxis and poiesis in Aristotle, see Mei (2009: pp. 55–73).

  32. Heidegger (1962: pp. 427/375).

  33. Heidegger (1962: pp. 118/85); cf. (1962: pp. 415/364): “Circumspective concern includes the understanding of a totality of involvements, and this understanding is based upon a prior understanding of the relationships of the ‘in-order-to’, the ‘towards-which’, the ‘towards-this’, and the ‘for-the-sake-of’ [….] Their unity makes up what we call the ‘world’.”

  34. Heidegger (1962: pp. 237/193).

  35. Heidegger (1962: pp. 305/261).

  36. This is a quote from McManus (2012: p. 70) who is critical of this claim. See Dreyfus (2000).

  37. Heidegger (1962: pp. 305/261).

  38. Heidegger (1997: p. 29). Heidegger’s (1995: pp. 120–125) positions seems to have altered in 1931 when broadening the dimension of work more explicitly in terms of logos.

  39. Heidegger (1997: p. 29).

  40. Gadamer (1976: p. 201) and Volpi (1994: p. 205). Cf. Dreyfus (2000), though on my view he conflates techne, or practical relations, with phronesis.

  41. Heidegger (1962: pp. 342/295). On phronesis and technology, see Lewin (2014).

  42. Mei (2009).

  43. Scharff (2011).

  44. This, as Malpas (2006: pp. 221, 227–28) has argued, occurs in place.

  45. Heidegger (1977: p. 13, 1971: p. 59).

  46. Brogan (2005: p. 112).

  47. Heidegger (1971: p. 168).

  48. Polanyi (2013: pp. 61, 64–65). The connection cannot be too strong as Polanyi relies on the notion of Gestalt, of which Heidegger was critical. Cf. Block (2011).

  49. Heidegger (1971: pp. 169, 172).

  50. Cf. Verbeek (2008: 11). Suffice it to say, I agree with Scharff (2012: p. 304) that such a term is not essentialist since the designation of essentialism assumes the kinds of (metaphysical) criteria of description Heidegger’s ontology rejects.

  51. Heidegger (1962: pp. 141/106; cf. pp. 100/71).

  52. Heidegger (1971: p. 59).

  53. Heidegger (1971: p. 227).

  54. Heidegger (1971: p. 217).

  55. Heidegger (1977: p. 29): “The revealing that brings forth (poiesis) is also a way that has the character of destining.”.

  56. Or dunamis meta logou; Heidegger (1995: p. 177).

  57. Heidegger (1995: p. 157; cf. pp. 129, 163).

  58. Heidegger (1995: p. 188).

  59. Heidegger (1995: p. 188).

  60. Brogan (2005: p. 142).

  61. Respectively, Heidegger (1971: pp. 167–174; 1971: pp. 152–158; 1998a: p. 58).

  62. As I explain later, I understand machinic autonomy distinct from the thesis that machines and technological media have an autonomous type of agency. See, for example, Ellul (2003: p. 386) and Kaplan (2009: p. xvii).

  63. Heidegger (1995: p. 161).

  64. Simondon (1989: p. 66).

  65. Arendt (1958: pp. 148, 1–3).

  66. Arendt (1958: pp. 148–149).

  67. Cf. Lewin on model-view controller (2014).

  68. Polanyi (2013: p. 328).

  69. Polanyi (2013: p. 328).

  70. Heidegger (1998b: p. 140; cf. on enframing 1977: p. 27).

  71. Heidegger (1977: p. 116).

  72. Cf. Polanyi (1962: pp. 329–331) on the limits of physical–chemical analysis and the understanding of machines.

  73. Heidegger (1962: pp. 466–471/414–418).

  74. Heidegger (1998b: p. 141).

  75. Heidegger (1977: p. 18).

  76. Or what Scharff (2011) describes as a “free and thoughtful” relation.

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Acknowledgments

My sincere thanks to Dominic Smith for his suggestions on a draft of this article, to Robert Scharff and Eoin Carney for discussions on technology and hermeneutics, and to the Scots Philosophical Association and the Scottish Centre for Continental Philosophy for providing essential funding which enabled me to complete the research of classical texts at the Sackler Library, Oxford University in 2014.

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Mei, T.S. Heidegger in the machine: the difference between techne and mechane . Cont Philos Rev 49, 267–292 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-015-9319-3

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