Skip to main content
Log in

Political connections and voluntary disclosure: the case of Canadian listed companies

  • Published:
Journal of Management and Governance Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Business and politics are now more connected than ever. In Canada, more than 50% of listed companies have political connections through the board of directors or top management. These ties can give companies the resources they need to achieve their goals and possibly even confer a substantial advantage that results in better financial performance. To this end, political connections must influence the various choices and behaviours of politically connected companies, such as their voluntary disclosure strategy. As this type of influence has rarely been investigated in the literature, the current study looks at the impact of board and top management political connections on the voluntary disclosure behaviour of Canadian firms. Four types of voluntary disclosure—environmental, social, governance and total—are analyzed. Results show that politically connected companies make broader voluntary disclosures than non-connected firms do. Board and top management political connections are positively and significantly related to total voluntary disclosure, and board political connections are positively and significantly related to governance disclosures. In addition, top management political connections are positively and significantly related to voluntary environmental and social disclosures. This study is the first to shed light on the link between political connections and the voluntary disclosure of Canadian listed companies, as well as the first to confirm that not all political connections are equal. The impact of these connections on companies’ choices and behaviours can differs according to the politically connected actor’s position in the company, including on the board of directors or in top management. This difference could be explained by the fact that while board are generally concerned about strategic issues, top management deal with operational aspects. Consequently, they may not have the same behaviours and choices.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. More than 50% of Canadian listed companies are considered politically connected (Dicko 2016a, b).

  2. As Bloomberg ESG scores measure voluntary disclosure, we assume that all the information in ESG scores, whether environmental, social or governance-related, was disclosed in a voluntary manner. As mentioned by Tamimi and Sebastianelli (2017), there is no mechanism to certify the quality of the Bloomberg database information. This might be considered as a limitation in our study.

References

  • Aboody, D., & Kasznik, R. (2000). CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29(1), 73–100. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(00)00014-8.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aerts, W., Cormier, D., & Magnan, M. (2007). The association between web-based corporate performance disclosure and financial analyst behaviour under different governance regimes. Corporate Governance: An International Review,15(6), 1301–1329.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. (1996). Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31(3), 377–397. https://doi.org/10.2307/2331397.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allegrini, M., & Greco, G. (2013). Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: Evidence from Italian listed companies. Journal of Management and Governance,17(1), 187–216.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baldini, M., Dal Maso, L., Liberatore, G., Mazzi, F., & Terzani, S. (2018). Role of country-and firm-level determinants in environmental, social, and governance disclosure. Journal of Business Ethics,150(1), 79–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barako, D. G., & Brown, A. M. (2008). Corporate social reporting and board representation: Evidence from the Kenyan banking sector. Journal of Management and Governance,12(4), 309.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barako, D. G., Hancock, P., & Izan, H. Y. (2006). Factors influencing voluntary disclosure by Kenyan companies. Corporate Governance,14, 107–125.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bernardi, C., & Stark, A. W. (2018). Environmental, social and governance disclosure, integrated reporting, and the accuracy of analyst forecasts. The British Accounting Review,50(1), 16–31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Botosan, C. (1997). Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review,72(3), 323–349.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boubakri, N., Guedhami, O., Mishra, D., & Saffar, W. (2012). Political connections and the cost of equity capital. Journal of Corporate Finance,18(3), 541–559.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J.G. Richardson (Eds.), Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education (pp. 241–258). Westport, CT: Greenwood.

    Google Scholar 

  • Branco, M. C., & Rodrigues, L. L. (2006). Corporate social responsibility and resource-based perspectives. Journal of Business Ethics,69(2), 111–132.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Broberg, P., Tagesson, T., & Collin, S. O. (2010). What explains variation in voluntary disclosure? A study of the annual reports of corporations listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Journal of Management and Governance,14(4), 351–377.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2003). Transparency, financial accounting information, and corporate governance. Economic Policy Review— Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 9(1), 65–87.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chaney, P. K., Faccio, M., & Parsley, D. (2011). The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics,51, 58–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.07.003.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen, C. J., Ding, Y., & Kim, C. F. (2010). High-level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst forecast accuracy around the world. Journal of International Business Studies,41(9), 1505–1524.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen, Y.-S., Shen, C.-H., & Lin, C.-Y. (2014). The benefits of political connection: Evidence from individual bank-loan contracts. Journal of Financial Services Research,45, 287–305. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-013-0167-1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Claessens, S., Feijen, E., & Laeven, L. (2008). Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economics,88, 554–580.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cormier, D., & Gordon, I. M. (2001). An examination of social and environmental reporting strategies. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal,14(5), 587–617.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dicko, S. (2016a). Firms political connections and winning government contracts. International Journal of Economics and Finance,8(2), 19–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dicko, S. (2016b). The impact of political connections on the quality of corporate governance. International Journal of Corporate Governance,7(3), 247–273.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dicko, S. (2017). Political connections, ownership structure and quality of governance. International Journal of Managerial Finance,13(4), 358–377.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dinc, I. S. (2005). Politicians and banks: Political influences on government-owned banks in emerging markets. Journal of Financial Economics,77, 453–479. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.011.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eccles, R. G., Serafeim, G., & Krzus, M. P. (2011). Market interest in nonfinancial information. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,23(4), 113–127.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ellis, J. A., Fee, C. E., & Thomas, S. E. (2012). Proprietary costs and the disclosure of information about customers. Journal of Accounting Research,50(3), 685–727.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eng, L. L., & Mak, Y. T. (2003). Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,22, 325–345.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Faccio, M. (2006). Politically connected firms. The American Economic Review,96(1), 369–389.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., & McConnell, J. J. (2006). Political connections and corporate bailouts. The Journal of Finance,LXI(6), 2597–2635.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301–325. https://doi.org/10.1086/467037.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Filip, A., Labelle, R., & Rousseau, S. (2015). Legal regime and financial reporting quality. Contemporary Accounting Research,32(1), 280–307. https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12071.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Getz, K. A. (1997). Research in corporate political action: Integration and assessment. Business and Society,36, 32–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Getz, K. A. (2002). Public affairs and political strategy: Theoretical foundations. Journal of Public Affairs,2(1), 305–329.

    Google Scholar 

  • Giannarakis, G. (2014). The determinants influencing the extent of CSR disclosure. International Journal of Law and Management,56(5), 393–416.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gibbins, M., Richardson, A., & Waterhouse, J. (1990). The management of corporate financial disclosure: Opportunism, ritualism, policies, and processes. Journal of Accounting Research, 28(1), 121–143. https://doi.org/10.2307/2491219.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gisbert, A., Navallas, B., & Romero, D. (2014). Proprietary costs, governance and the segment disclosure decision. Journal of Management and Governance,18(3), 733–763.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hadani, M. (2007). Family matters: Founding family firms and corporate political activity. Business and Society,46(4), 395–428.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Healy, P. M., Hutton, A. P., & Palepu, K. G. (1999). Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research,16(3), 485–520.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics,31(1–3), 405–440.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hillman, A. J., Withers, M. C., & Collins, B. J. (2009). Resource dependence theory: A review. Journal of Management,35(6), 1404–1427.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ho, S. S., & Wong, K. S. (2001). A study of the relationship between corporate governance structures and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation,10(2), 139–156.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ho, S. M., & Wong, K. S. (2003). Prepers perception of corporate reporting and disclosure. International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 1(1), 71–81. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jdg.2040014.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Houston, J. F., Jiang, L., Lin, C., & Ma, Y. (2014). Political connections and the cost of bank loans. Journal of Accounting Research,52(1), 193–243. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12038.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hung, M., Kim, Y., & Li, S. (2018). Political connections and voluntary disclosure: Evidence from around the world. Journal of International Business Studies,49(3), 272–302. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-017-0139-z.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Islam, M. A., & Deegan, C. (2010). Media pressures and corporate disclosure of social responsibility performance information: A study of two global clothing and sports retail companies. Accounting and Business Research,40(2), 131–148.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2000). The economic consequences of increased disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research,38(Supplement 2000), 91–124.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maman, D. (2000). Who accumulates directorships of big business firms in Israel? Organizational structure, social capital and human capital. Human Relations,53(5), 603–629.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meek, G. K., Roberts, C. B., & Gray, S. J. (2005). Factors influencing voluntary annual reports disclosures by US, UK and continental European multinational corporations. Journal of International Business Studies,26, 555–572.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mitchell, R. K., Lee, J. H., & Agle, B. R. (2017). Stakeholder prioritization work: The role of stakeholder salience in stakeholder research. In D. M. Wasielesk & J. Weber (Eds.), Stakeholder management (pp. 123–157). Bingley: Emerald Publishing Limited.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Parliament of Canada Act. (2018). Published by the Minister of Justice. Last amended on June 21, 2018, Current to September 26, 2018.

  • Parsons, L. M. (2007). The impact of financial information and voluntary disclosures on contributions to not-for-profit organizations. Behavioral Research in Accounting, 19(1), 179–196. https://doi.org/10.2308/bria.2007.19.1.179.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Patten, D. M. (1992). Intra-industry environmental disclosures in response to the Alaskan oil spill: A note on legitimacy theory. Accounting, Organizationsand Society, 17(5), 471–475. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(92)90042-Q.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors. Administrative Science Quarterly,17, 218–229.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pfeffer, J. (1981). Power in organizations. Marshfield, MA: Pitman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. New York: Harper & Row.

    Google Scholar 

  • Richardson, A. J., & Welker, M. (2001). Social disclosure, financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital. Accounting, Organizations and Society,26, 597–616.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scott, T. W. (1994). Incentives and disincentives for financial disclosure: Voluntary disclosure of defined benefit pension plan information by Canadian firms. Accounting Review, 69(1), 26–43.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52, 737–783. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tamimi, N., & Sebastianelli, R. (2017). Transparency among S&P 500 companies: An analysis of ESG disclosure scores. Management Decision,55(8), 1660–1680.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wiseman, J. (1982). An evaluation of environmental disclosures made in corporate annual reports. Accounting Organizations and Society, 7(1), 53–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(82)90025-3.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zogning, F. (2017). Comparing financial systems around the world: Capital markets, legal systems, and governance regimes. Economics, Management and Financial Markets,12(4), 43–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Saidatou Dicko.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Dicko, S., Khemakhem, H. & Zogning, F. Political connections and voluntary disclosure: the case of Canadian listed companies. J Manag Gov 24, 481–506 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-019-09471-3

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-019-09471-3

Keywords

Navigation