Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed Companies

  • Published:
Journal of Management & Governance Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper investigates the interplay between governance and disclosure in an agency setting, featured by concentrated ownership and high insider shareholders representation in the board. In this context, agency conflicts happen between large controlling shareholders and minority outside investors, with risks of private benefits exploitation. We regressed a voluntary disclosure index on seven governance variables related either to the board structure and functioning. The empirical evidence is provided by the Italian stock market. Our results suggest the presence of a complementary relationship between governance and disclosure. Diligent monitoring activity is associated with greater transparency to the outside. The findings are consistent with the view that internal and external control tend to be present at the same time, since the presence of one of them reduces the incentive for the controlling shareholders to limit the other. The empirical evidence also show that larger boards are not detrimental to outside shareholders, with regard to voluntary disclosure. The study can contribute to the understanding of the relationship between governance and disclosure in a particular agency setting. They might be of interest to practitioners and regulators, insofar as they are consistent with calls for more disclosure requirements in this agency setting.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Consistently with prior definitions in different regulatory national environments (Cooke 1989b; Raffournier 1995; Meek et al. 1995; Depoers 2000), we define voluntary disclosure as the information released to the outside, deriving from the management’s insider knowledge of the company, which are not required to be published in regulated reports. Voluntary disclosure is therefore produced by a management’s reporting decision (Meek et al. 1995; Healy and Palepu 2001).

  2. This happened in the Parmalat and Cirio financial frauds in Italy. A number of minority shareholders were also company’s employees.

  3. Risks of wealth expropriation by controlling shareholders and reduced legal protection produce adverse incentive for small investors. This might explain why Italy, as other Countries with similar features, has a relatively small public equity market (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002).

  4. Both Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) tentatively suggest a range of acceptable board sizes, neither too small, nor too large. Jensen claims that boards should not exceed seven or eight members, whilst Lipton and Lorsch advocate a limit of ten members, with a preferable size of eight or nine.

  5. “The LID provides a focal point for non-executive directors and establishes some measure of independence between executives and non-executive directors. (…) In firms where CEO duality is in place, the appointment of a LID can serve as an effective substitute for a non-executive chairperson” (Dalton and Dalton 2005, p. 93).

  6. In this setting, “since best practices in corporate governance and greater disclosure are just being promoted, there is probably a cross-sectional variance in corporate governance and disclosure among firms” (Eng and Mak 2003, p. 327). The cross-sectional differences provide a research avenue to examine whether corporate governance practices are associated with variations in voluntary disclosure practices.

  7. Botosan (1997) obtains a coefficient alpha computed on standardized data of 0.64. Gul and Leung (2004) computes a coefficient alpha of 0.51.

  8. This comparison can provide some interesting insights, but it is obviously limited by the considered samples composition.

  9. Laksmana (2008) find in a sample of 232 companies (sorted out from the S&P 500) an average board meeting frequency of 7.26 meetings per year.

  10. Following a reviewer suggestion, the reported coefficients estimates and their significance are those of Model 1, including the industry control variables we used in the further investigations. The industry coefficients estimates are not reported.

  11. We identified some potentially influential observations with the Cook’s D and then performed a robust regression (reg command with Stata). Since the differences in the t-statistics were not significant, we present the regular OLS output (Gujarati 2004). We would have anyway carefully considered the rejection of some outliers since, when the empirical research is delivered on a population, this could exclude important parts of the sample (Fox 1997, p. 268; Gujarati 2004, p. 541).

  12. “Generally speaking, it is probably a good idea to use the WHITE option [available in regression programs] routinely, perhaps comparing the output with regular OLS output as a check to see whether heteroskedasticity is a serious problem in a particular set of data” (Wallace and Silver 1988, p. 265).

  13. We found almost no information about the L.I.D. activity in the governance reports. Most companies only report that they have appointed as L.I.D. an independent director already in charge.

  14. VIF test was calculated for each model, in order to verify the absence of multicollinearity. We performed robustness checks to assess that heteroskedasticity is not a significant problem through specific test (White and Breusch-Pagan) and repeating the regression with the WHITE option, as for Model 1 (Wallace and Silver 1988).

  15. This research shares with other empirical cross-sectional studies a potential limitation related to the possibility of omitted variables and spurious correlations (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). Unobserved omitted variables could be correlated with both governance and disclosure, leading to a spurious relationship between them. This feature invites to prudence especially when making policy recommendations.

References

  • Ahmed, K., & Courtis, J. K. (1999). Associations between corporate characteristics and disclosure levels in annual reports: A meta-analysis. The British Accounting Review, 31, 35–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ahmed, K., & Nicholls, D. (1994). The impact of non-financial company characteristics on mandatory disclosure compliance in developing countries: The case of Bangladesh. The International Journal of Accounting, 29(1), 62–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ajinkya, B., Bhojraj, S., & Sengupta, P. (2005). The association between outside directors, institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research, 43(3), 343–375.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Akhtaruddin, M., Hossain, M. A., Hossain, M., & Yao, L. (2009). Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports of malaysian listed firms. Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research, 7(1), 1–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • ANDAF (Italian National Association of Chief Financial Officers). (2008). Gli annual report delle società italiane. Rome: ANDAF Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board composition: Balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49(2), 209–237.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beattie, V., McInnes, B., & Fearnley, S. (2004). A methodology for analysing and evaluating narratives in annual reports: A comprehensive descriptive profile and metrics for disclosure quality attributes. Accounting Forum, 28(3), 205–236.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beretta, S., & Bozzolan, S. (2008). Quality versus quantity: The case of forward-looking disclosure. Journal of Accounting Auditing & Finance, 23(3), 333–375.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blue Ribbon Report. (1999). Report and recommendations of the blue ribbon committee on improving the effectiveness of corporate audit committees. New York: New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boone, A. L., Field, L. C., Karpoff, J. M., & Raheja, C. G. (2007). The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 85, 66–101.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Botosan, C. A. (1997). Disclosure level and the cost of capital. The Accounting Review, 72(3), 323–349.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cadbury Committee Report. (1992). Report of the Cadbury committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance. London: Gee.

    Google Scholar 

  • Camfferman, K., & Cooke, T. (2002). An analysis of disclosure in the annual reports of U.K. and Dutch companies. Journal of International Accounting Research, 1, 3–30.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carcello, J. V., Hermanson, D. R., Neal, T. L., & Riley, R. A. (2002). Board characteristics and audit fees. Contemporary Accounting Research, 19(3), 365–384.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cerbioni, F., & Parbonetti, A. (2007). Exploring the effects of corporate governance on intellectual capital disclosure: An analysis of European biotechnology companies. European Accounting Review, 16(4), 791–826.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chau, G. K., & Gray, S. J. (2002). Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore. The International Journal of Accounting, 37(2), 247–265.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chavent, M., Ding, Y., Fu, L., Stolowy, H., & Wang, H. (2006). Disclosure and determinants studies: An extension using the clustering divisive method (DIV). European Accounting Review, 15(2), 181–218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen, C. J. P., & Jaggi, B. (2000). Association between independent non-executive directors, family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 19(2), 285–310.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cheng, E. C. M., & Courtenay, S. M. (2006). Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure. The International Journal of Accounting, 41, 262–289.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chhaochharia, V., & Grinstein, Y. (2007). The changing structure of US corporate boards: 1997–2003. Corporate Governance, 15(6), 1215–1223.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J., & Lang, L. (1999). Expropriation of minority shareholders: Evidence from East Asia. Policy Research paper 2088. Washington, DC: World Bank.

    Google Scholar 

  • Código de Buen Gobierno (Olivencia Code) (1998). El Gobierno de las Sociedades Cotizadas, Special Commission to Consider a Code of Ethics for Companies’ Boards of Directors appointed by the Spanish Cabinet.

  • Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2008). Boards: Does one size fit at all? Journal of Financial Economics, 87, 329–356.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Collier, P., & Gregory, A. (1999). Audit committee activity and agency costs. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 18, 311–332.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. I. (1998). Board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41(2), 146–157.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cooke, T. E. (1989a). Disclosure in the corporate annual reports of Swedish companies. Accounting and Business Research, 19(2), 113–122.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cooke, T. E. (1989b). Voluntary corporate disclosure by Swedish companies. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 1(2), 171–195.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cronbach, L. (1951). Coefficient alpha and internal structure of tests. Psychometrika, 16, 297–334.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1998). Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 19, 269–290.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dalton, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (2005). Boards of directors: Utilizing empirical evidence in developing practical prescriptions. British Journal of Management, 16, S91–S97.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Darrough, M. N., & Stoughton, N. M. (1990). Financial disclosure policy in an entry game. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12, 219–243.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DeAngelo, H., & DeAngelo, L. (2000). Controlling stockholders and the disciplinary role of corporate payout policy: A study of the Times Mirror Company. Journal of Financial Economics, 56(2), 153–207.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Depoers, F. (2000). A cost benefit study of voluntary disclosure: Some empirical evidence from French listed companies. European Accounting Review, 9(2), 245–263.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Di Pietra, R., Grambovas, C., Raonic, I., & Riccaboni, A. (2008). The effects of board size and ‘‘busy’’ directors on the market value of Italian firms. Journal of Management and Governance, 12, 73–91.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dyck, A., & Zingales, A. (2004). Private benefits of control: An international comparison. The Journal of Finance, LIX(2), 537–600.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eng, L. L., & Mak, Y. T. (2003). Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 22(4), 325–345.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Faccio, M., Lang, L. H. P., & Young, L. (2001). Dividends and expropriation. American Economic Review, 91(1), 54–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problem and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288–308.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fama, E., & Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301–326.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Financial Report Council (2006). The Combined Code on Corporate Governance. Available online: http://www.frc.org.uk/CORPORATE/COMBINEDCODE.CFM.

  • Finkelstein, S., & D’Aveni, D. A. (1994). CEO duality as a double-edged sword: How boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command. Academy of Management Journal, 37, 1079–1108.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Florackis, C. (2005). Internal corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance: Evidence for UK firms. Applied Financial Economics Letters, 1, 211–216.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fox, J. (1997). Applied regression analysis, linear models, and related methods. California: Sage Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gujarati, D. N. (2004). Basic econometrics. Boston: McGraw-Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gul, F. A., & Leung, S. (2004). Board leadership, outside directors’ expertise and voluntary corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 23(5), 351–379.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31, 405–440.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hermalin, B., & Weisbach, M. (2003). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature. Economic Policy Review, 9, 7–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ho, R. (2006). Handbook of univariate and multivariate data analysis and interpretation with SPSS. Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis Group.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ho, S. M., & Wong, K. S. (2001). A study of the relationship between corporate governance structures and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 10(1), 139–156.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holderness, C. G. (2003). A survey of blockholders and corporate control. Economic Policy Review, 9(1), 51–64.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hossain, M., Perera, M., & Rahman, A. (1995). Voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of New Zealand companies. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 6(1), 69–85.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Informe Aldama (Aldama Report) (2003) Informe de la Comisión Especial para el Fomento de la Transparencia y Seguridad en los Mercados y en las Sociedades Cotizadas, CNMV.

  • Italian Stock Exchange (2006). Corporate governance self-discipline code. Available online: http://www.borsaitaliana.it/documenti/regolamenti/corporategovernance/corporategovernance.htm.

  • Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831–880.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Karamanou, I., & Vafeas, N. (2005). The association between corporate boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research., 43(3), 453–486.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein, A. (1998). Firm performance and board committee structure. Journal of Law and Economics, 41(1), 275–299.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krippendorf, K. (2004). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications.

  • Laksmana, I. (2008). Corporate board governance and voluntary disclosure of executive compensation practices. Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(4), 1147–1182.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lambert, R. A. (2001). Contracting theory and accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32(1), 3–87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lang, M., & Lundholm, R. (1993). Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of corporate disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 31(2), 246–271.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Larmou, S., & Vafeas, N. (2010). The relation between board size and firm performance in firms with a history of poor operating performance. Journal of Management and Governance, 14, 61–85.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leftwich, R. W., Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1981). Voluntary corporate disclosure: The case of interim reporting. Journal of Accounting Research, 19(Suppl), 50–77.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leuz, C., & Oberholzer-Gee, F. (2006). Political relationships, global financing, and corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Financial Economics, 81, 411–439.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leuz, C., & Wysocki, P. (2008). Economic consequences of financial reporting and disclosure regulation: A review and suggestions for future research, working paper.

  • Li, J., Pike, R., & Haniffa, R. (2008). Intellectual capital disclosure and corporate governance structures in UK firms. Accounting and Business Research, 38(2), 137–159.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lim, S., Matolcsy, Z., & Chow, D. (2007). The association between board composition and different types of voluntary disclosure. European Accounting Review, 16(3), 555–583.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A model proposal for improved corporate governance. Business Lawyer, 48(1), 59–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lynck, J. S., Netter, J. M., & Yang, T. (2008). The determinants of board structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 87, 308–328.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Main, B. G. M., & Johnston, J. (1993). Remuneration committees and corporate governance. Accounting and Business Research, 23, 351–362.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mancinelli, L., & Ozkan, A. (2006). Ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from Italian firms. The European Journal of Finance, 12(3), 265–282.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marston, C. L., & Shrives, P. J. (1991). The use of disclosure indices in accounting research: A review article. The British Accounting Review, 23(3), 195–210.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McKinnon, J., & Dalimunthe, J. (1993). Voluntary disclosure of segment information by Australian diversified companies. Accounting and Finance, 33(1), 33–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meek, G. K., Roberts, C. B., & Gray, S. J. (1995). Factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosures by US and UK and continental European multinational corporations. Journal of International Business Studies, 26(3), 555–572.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mendez, C. F., & Garcia, R. A. (2007). The effects of ownership structure and board composition on the audit committee meeting frequency: Spanish evidence. Corporate Governance, 15(5), 909–922.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Menon, K., & Williams, J. D. (1994). The use of audit committees for monitoring. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 13(2), 121–139.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O’Sullivan, M., Percy, M., & Stewart, J. (2008). Australian evidence on corporate governance attributes and their association with forward-looking information in the annual report. Journal of Management and Governance, 12, 5–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • OECD (1999) Principles of Corporate Governance.

  • Park, Y. W., & Shin, H. H. (2004). Board composition and earnings management in Canada. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10(3), 431–457.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Patelli, L., & Prencipe, A. (2007). The relationship between voluntary disclosure and independent directors in the presence of a dominant shareholder. European Accounting Review, 16(1), 5–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raffournier, B. (1995). The determinants of voluntary financial disclosure by Swiss listed companies. European Accounting Review, 4(2), 261–280.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rajan, R., & Zingales, L. (1998). Which capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian Crisis. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 11(3), 40–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rediker, K. J., & Seth, A. (1995). Boards of directors and substitution effects of alternative governance mechanisms. Strategic Management Journal, 16, 85–99.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ruland, W., Tung, S., & George, N. E. (1990). Factors associated with the disclosure of managers’ forecasts. The Accounting Review, 65(3), 710–721.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shivdasani, A., & Yermack, D. (1999). CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: An empirical analysis. Journal of Finance, 54(5), 1829–1853.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, LII(2).

  • Shleifer, A., & Wolfenzon, D. (2002). Investor protection and equity market. Journal of Financial Economics, 66, 3–27.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vafeas, N. (1999a). The nature of board nominating committees and their role in corporate governance. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 26(1), 199–225.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vafeas, N. (1999b). Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 113–142.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Verrecchia, R. E. (1983). Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5, 179–194.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Volpin, P. F. (2002). Governance with poor investor protection: Evidence from top executive turnover in Italy. Journal of Financial Economics, 64, 61–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wallace, T. D., & Silver, J. L. (1988). Econometrics: An introduction. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

    Google Scholar 

  • White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 48(4), 817–838.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yermack, D. (1996) Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185–211.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zingales, L. (1994). The value of the voting right: A study of the Milan stock exchange experience. Review of Financial Studies, 7, 125–148.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

The Authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of two anonymous reviewers. The Authors also wishes to thank the participants of the 7th European Academic Conference on Internal Audit and Corporate Governance in London. Special thanks to Professor Georges Selim, David Alexander and Luciano Marchi. The Authors gratefully acknowledge Professor Carlo Bianchi for his helpful advices. The paper is the result of a joint effort of the two Authors. In particular, Marco Allegrini wrote the Sects. 1 and 6, while Giulio Greco wrote the Sects. 2 to 5.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Business Administration “E. Giannessi”, University of Pisa, Via C. Ridolfi, 10, 56124, Pisa, Italy

    Marco Allegrini & Giulio Greco

Authors
  1. Marco Allegrini
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Giulio Greco
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Giulio Greco.

Appendix: list of items

Appendix: list of items

1.1 Financial information

  1. 1.

    Profitability ratios

  2. 2.

    Financial structure ratios

  3. 3.

    Liquidity ratios

  4. 4.

    Cash flow ratios

  5. 5.

    Other ratios (i.e. productivity ones)

  6. 6.

    Operating working capital and/or needs of operating working capital

  7. 7.

    EBITDA

  8. 8.

    Free cash flow from operations

  9. 9.

    Change in sales

  10. 10.

    Change in operating income

  11. 11.

    Change in net income

  12. 12.

    Change in R&D expenditures

  13. 13.

    Organic growth

  14. 14.

    EVA® and/or residual income measure

  15. 15.

    WACC

1.2 Projected information

  1. 16.

    A comparison of previous earnings projection to actual earnings

  2. 17.

    A comparison of previous sales projection to actual sales

  3. 18.

    A forecast of market share (quantitative)

  4. 19.

    A cash flow projection (quantitative)

  5. 20.

    A projection of future capital expenditure (quantitative)

  6. 21.

    A projection of future R&D expenditures (quantitative)

  7. 22.

    A projection of future earnings (quantitative)

  8. 23.

    A projection of future sales (quantitative)

1.3 Capital market data

  1. 24.

    Share price trend

  2. 25.

    Comments on the firm’s share price evolution (qualitative)

  3. 26.

    Comparison between the firm’s share price evolution and the evolution of market indices

  4. 27.

    Evolution of the volume of transactions

  5. 28.

    Market capitalization

1.4 Strategic information

  1. 29.

    A statement of corporate goals or objectives

  2. 30.

    A general statement of corporate strategy

  3. 31.

    Actions taken during the year to achieve the corporate goals

  4. 32.

    Information about mergers and acquisitions

  5. 33.

    Macro-economic scenario discussed

  6. 34.

    Competitive environment discussed

  7. 35.

    Regulation and legislation affecting business discussed

  8. 36.

    Analysis of the competitors

  9. 37.

    Distribution of the customers (by type or by geographic area)

  10. 38.

    Description of the brands/trademarks

  11. 39.

    Quantitative and non-financial information about production or sales (for example, number of tons produced)

  12. 40.

    The management organization chart

1.5 Risk information

  1. 41.

    Information about the firm’s risk management system

  2. 42.

    Information about risks related to the macro-economic scenario

  3. 43.

    Information about risks related to the competitive environment

  4. 44.

    Information about risks related to customers

  5. 45.

    Information about risks related to production/logistics

  6. 46.

    Information about risks related to human resources/relationship with trade unions

  7. 47.

    Information about risks related to IT/information systems/data security

  8. 48.

    Information about risks related to frauds/crimes committed by employees

  9. 49.

    Information about risks related to the company’s reputation

  10. 50.

    Information about risks related to reporting

  11. 51.

    Information about risks related to legal compliance with labour laws and regulations (i.e. regulations about security issues)

  12. 52.

    Information about risks related to the compliance with industry/antitrust regulations

  13. 53.

    Information about risks related to the impact of the firm’s operations on the natural environment

1.6 Sustainability information

  1. 54.

    A brief history of the company

  2. 55.

    Description of employees policy

  3. 56.

    Information about social sustainability policies

  4. 57.

    Social sustainability performance indicators

  5. 58.

    Stakeholders map

  6. 59.

    Information about environmental sustainability policies

  7. 60.

    Environmental sustainability performance indicators

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Allegrini, M., Greco, G. Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed Companies. J Manag Gov 17, 187–216 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-011-9168-3

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-011-9168-3

Keywords

JEL Classification

Search

Navigation