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A Multi-Agent Coalition Formation Method Based on Preference Models

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Abstract

Coordination is one of the fundamental research issues in distributed artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. Current multi-agent coalition formation methods present two major problems. First, some of these methods can be applied only to cooperative multi-agent systems; second, the algorithms proposed may fail in the formation of the coalitions. This article proposes two methods for problems of agent coalition formation in cooperative and non-cooperative multi-agent systems. These methods are based on agent preference models and on preference aggregation using the Choquet integral. Our first method based on the evolutionary system design (ESD) methodology proposed by M. Shakun is required for competitive multi-agent systems, whereas our second method is powerful for cooperative multi-agent systems where the agents can exchange their information.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. LIP6, Université Paris 6, 8, rue du Capitaine Scott, 75015, Paris Cedex 15, France

    Samir Aknine

  2. LAMSADE, Université Paris Dauphine, Place du Maréchal De Lattre De Tassigny, 75775, Paris Cedex 16, France

    Suzanne Pinson

  3. Leonard, N. Stern School of Business, New York University, 44, West 4th Street, New York, NY, 10012-1126, USA

    Melvin F. Shakun

Authors
  1. Samir Aknine
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  2. Suzanne Pinson
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  3. Melvin F. Shakun
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Aknine, S., Pinson, S. & Shakun, M.F. A Multi-Agent Coalition Formation Method Based on Preference Models. Group Decis Negot 13, 513–538 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-005-3074-5

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