Abstract
The paper evaluates the performance of two multi-object auction models: sequential and simultaneous, using different performance measures. The objects put up for auction have different synergies for different bidders. We define different types of bidders who can exist in these multi-object auction models. The classification of bidders is based on the bidding strategies they use. We then study the effects of different parameters in auction and bidding strategies, on the performance of these auction models by simulating them using a JAVA based framework.
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This material is based upon work supported by a National Science Foundation grant (DMI 9800449) to the Dharmaraj Veeramani last author. The authors also thank the referees of the paper and the area editors for their valuable comments on the work.
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Mishra, D., Reddy, S.S. & Veeramani, D. Performance Evaluation of Multi-Object Auctions. Electron Commerce Res 5, 293–307 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-005-6160-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-005-6160-5