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Is there room for containing healthcare costs? An analysis of regional spending differentials in Italy

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Abstract

This work aims at identifying the determinants of health spending differentials among Italian regions and at highlighting potential margins for savings. The analysis exploits a data set for the 21 Italian regions and autonomous provinces starting in the early 1990s and ending in 2006. After controlling for standard healthcare demand indicators, remaining spending differentials are found to be significant, and they appear to be associated with differences in the degree of appropriateness of treatments, health sector supply structure and social capital indicators. In general, higher regional expenditure does not appear to be associated with better reported or perceived quality in health services. In the regions that display poorer performances, inefficiencies appear not to be uniformly distributed among expenditure items. Overall, results suggest that savings could be achieved without reducing the amount of services provided to citizens. This seems particularly important given the expected rise in spending associated with the forecasted demographic developments.

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Notes

  1. A similar argument has been put forward also in other analysis. For example, for the US, a CBO study argued that ‘large differences across the country in spending for the care of similar patients could indicate a health care system that is not efficient as it could be, particularly if that higher spending does not produce a commensurately better care or improved health outcomes’ (see CBO [6]).

  2. In particular, we consider all the Italian regions, both ordinary and special statute plus the two autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano.

  3. Within given guidelines, regions are allowed to define some characteristics of the health system, such as the structure of the hospital network, the share of private providers and the extent to which they resort to direct distribution of pharmaceuticals.

  4. Also recent measures on fiscal federalism maintain the principle of equalising resources among the regions on the basis of the population’s need for healthcare. The challenge of the reform lies in defining the criteria (the ‘standard costs’) to compute such needs. For a description of the evolution of the financing mechanisms of the NHS, see for example Caroppo and Turati [5].

  5. The fiscal capacity of the Italian regions is strongly (if not mainly) affected by the uneven distribution of the tax bases across the country (see De Matteis and Messina [10]), which reflects the degree of economic development of the regions themselves and can be marginally changed by the economic policies adopted within each region.

  6. Different arrangements are in place between the ordinary statute regions and the special statute ones (Valle d’Aosta, Trento, Bolzano, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardegna and Sicilia). However, this affects mainly the composition of financing (share of own resources vs. funds drawn from national general taxation). The principle of providing comprehensive and homogeneous coverage through a national health system applies to all parts of the country.

  7. For example, Bordignon and Turati [3] suggest that the reason behind the expenditure reduction in the mid 1990s was the temporary changes in the expectations by the regions, which, at the time perceived central government’s threat not to bail them out in the event of spending overruns to be a credible one. Another explanation is the presence of flypaper effects and the temporary reduction in transfers from the central to local governments in the early 1990s.

  8. For example, regarding the hospital sector, Iuzzolino [23] observes that, compared with the other OECD countries, Italy has a larger share of public hospitals of small size, probably because of poorer outpatient care and an unbalanced allocation of resources between different types of services. This is reflected in the unit costs of hospitalisation and the share of outlays for hospital in total spending, which are higher than the OECD average.

  9. For the details of the model estimation, see [17].

  10. Patient mobility among regions is allowed under the national public healthcare system: healthcare costs are covered by the NHS independently of the region actually providing the service.

  11. In order to compute per capita public current health expenditure adjusted for patient mobility and the age structure of the population, we have used population data (broken down by region and age) and the coefficients published by Ministero della Salute [27], which capture differences in the consumption of pharmaceuticals and hospital services between individuals at different ages. We have then adjusted expenditure to take into account population mobility (using expenditure data for non-residents published yearly by Ministero dell’Economia e delle finanze for each region) and finally computed spending per capita values. For more details, see [17].

  12. In particular, taking into account patient mobility and the age structure of the population, the per-capita expenditure of the southern regions in 2006 increases from 1,601 euros to 1,703 euros, while in the Centre and the North it decreases from 1,735 euros to 1,680.

  13. This assumption is consisent with the literature on soft budget constraints and with the evidence of systematic spending overruns and deficits in the health sector.

  14. w i can be interpreted as the cost of inefficiency for region i.

  15. For a more detailed discussion of the impact of the financing mechanism in our framework, see [17].

  16. In our analysis we do not include the latter variables as the regions share a common institutional framework.

  17. The specification used reflects the nature of the regressors. All of them, apart from per capita GDP, are ratios or dummies.

  18. An alternative estimation strategy would be to implement a multilevel model that simultaneously considers both the first and the second step. Even though this procedure could be more efficient, it has two main drawbacks: (1) it requires stronger distributional assumptions on the error terms; (2) it would make it less straightforward to work out an estimate of the inefficiency levels and decompose and analyse them as reported in the following paragraph. We have estimated such a model as a robustness check, however; estimated coefficients of the variables from the first and the second step and their significance are in line with those obtained following a two-step procedure.

  19. Both the proxies for the health status and ‘bad’ habits are obtained via a principal component analysis (see Table 2), which allows us to reduce the dimension of the set of regressors and exploit the correlation among the variables.

  20. In particular, the followings are taken into account: the share of smokers (variable ‘smoke’), the share of the population drinking at least half a litre of wine a day (variable ‘wine’) and the share of those who drink alcohol at least twice a week (variable ‘alcohol’).

  21. Including measures of development as demand factors may raise some concerns about possible correlation between those variables and regional supply-side characteristics, such as wage levels and the quality of human capital. This problem however is quite minor in the Italian setting. Indeed, (1) as concern wages, national labour contracts have been used and are used in the Italian NHS so that there are no systematic differences in this respect across the country; (2) as regards human capital quality, hiring procedure are based on the same requirements (in terms of medical school degrees, specialisation patterns) across the whole country.

  22. In particular, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 for the years after 1995.

  23. Since the modified Wald suggests the presence of heteroskedasticity and the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data [35] rejects the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation, the standard error estimator used is robust to both hetoreskedasticity and serial correlation.

  24. Second step results (to be discussed in the sixth section) are confirmed by using fixed effects obtained by this restricted model, too. These robustenss check results (both for step 1 and step 2) are available upon request.

  25. The correlation among the two fixed effects series is 0.94.

  26. As to the magnitude of the expenditure categories considered, it should be noted that in 2005, for the Italian average, wages accounted for 33 % of total expenditure, the purchase of goods and services for 27 %, primary care for 6 %, pharmaceuticals for 13 %, private hospital care for 9 % and specialised care for 4 %.

  27. Given (7), regional effects can be obtained by aggregating the results of the estimation of the expenditure items equations as: \( \hat{\alpha }_{{i{\text{ disag}}}} = \ln \left[ {\sum\limits_{h = 1}^{H} {s_{i}^{h} e^{{\hat{\alpha }_{i}^{h} }} } } \right] \). The correlation between \( \hat{\alpha }_{i} \) and \( \hat{\alpha }_{{i{\text{ disag}}}} \) is 0.99.

  28. The difference can be decomposed as follows: \( \Updelta_{i} = \xi_{i} - \xi_{\hbox{min} } = \sum\limits_{h = 1}^{H} {(\kappa_{i}^{h} - \kappa_{{i{ \hbox{min} }}}^{h} ) = \sum\limits_{h = 1}^{H} {\Updelta_{i}^{h} } } \) where \( \kappa_{i}^{h} = s_{i}^{h} \tilde{\xi }_{i}^{h} \) is the contribution of each expenditure item and variables with the subscipt min refer to the region with the lowest α i . Values shown in Fig. 3a are computed considering the average values of \( s_{i}^{h} \) over the estimated period.

  29. If \( \tilde{\xi }_{i}^{h} = 1 \, \forall h \) (the term of comparison this time is the case in which inefficiency is uniformly distributed among the expenditure items and equal to aggregate minimum \( \alpha_{i \, \hbox{min} } \)) then \( \kappa_{i}^{h} = s_{i}^{h} \). It follows that the described difference can be decomposed as: \( \Updelta_{i} = \xi_{i} - \xi_{{i{\text{ ref}}}} = \sum\limits_{h = 1}^{H} ( \kappa_{i}^{h} - s_{i}^{h} ) = \sum\limits_{h = 1}^{H} {\tilde{\Updelta }_{i}^{h} } \).

  30. Taking a region i, values of \( \left| {\vartheta_{i}^{h} } \right| \) that are close to zero for every h suggest that in region i the level of inefficiency is similar among the various expenditure items. A large value of \( \vartheta_{i}^{h} \) for a given h implies a particularly high value of \( \tilde{\xi }_{i}^{h} \) for that item with respect to the others. An analytical discussion of indicator \( \vartheta_{i}^{h} \) is provided in Appendix 2.

  31. This means that for the regions under consideration the inefficiency level for this item, although large, is less pronounced than the inefficiency in other spending categories.

  32. In particular, we consider the attraction index, measured as the ratio between the inflow and outflow of patients into a given region (data from Ministero della Salute [26]). An index value >1 means that the inflow of patients from other regions is greater than the outflow to other regions and hence the region attracts patients from other areas of the country.

  33. The satisfaction with hospital services is drawn from surveys included in the Indagine multiscopo regularly performed by Istat.

  34. The correlation between the average case mix (measured as the standard hospital stay multiplied by the normalised applicable DRG) over the observed period and regional fixed effects is −0.89.

  35. Compensation of employees represents an exception; wages are set by national labour contracts (however regions can decide on the number and composition of employees).

  36. This is consistent with the assumption of regional effects being time invariant. As seen above, the time invariant component estimated using time varying frontier models or fixed effects gives equivalent results. Apart from the common impact due to the decaying factor, estimated waste levels are strongly correlated using the four estimation procedures discussed in Appendix 1.

  37. The indicators considered under this category are the average over the observed period of the incidence of Caesarian sections and of the incidence of patients discharged by a surgical ward with a medical DRG (data from Ministero della Salute [26]).

  38. In this category we considered the averages of the incidence of NHS employees on residents; composition of employees (ratio of medical staff over total employees); incidences of public hospital beds on residents; incidences of private hospital beds; ratio between number of beds in private to public hospitals; share of expenditure for care provided by private hospitals; average stay in public hospitals; average stay in private hospitals; number of general pratictioners; number of patients per general pratictioner; number of general pratictioners with more than 1,500 patients. All the data are drawn from ISTAT, Health for All.

  39. To proxy the quality of administration we consider: the share of pharmaceutical expenditure for generic (off-patent) pharmaceuticals and the share of expenditure for pharmaceuticals delivered directly by the NHS in total pharmaceutical expenditure. We also consider an indicator for the use of IT in other Italian local governments in each region; in particular, we use a municipality IT index, which is given by the share of municipalities whose general registry office has been computerised.

  40. In particular, we consider several proxies for social capital commonly used in the literature: incidence of blood donors per 1,000 residents; incidence of recyclable waste collection; average turnout at referenda; interest in politics and morality. The indicators for solidarity/‘morality’ and participation/‘interest in politics’ are drawn from Giordano et al. [20]. In particular, solidarity/‘morality’ is a composite index summarising self-reported pro-social attitudes and objective measures of altruistic behaviour (such as blood donation); similarly, interest in politics is built from self-reported answers and more objective measures (such as referendum participation).

  41. All the estimated models exclude the constant term. In fact, the mean value of the fixed effects is zero by construction. To check for this, however, we also replicate the estimation including the constant term, which turns out to be not significant. Moreover, neither the sign nor the magnitude of the estimated coefficients are affected by including/excluding the constant.

  42. In this case, however, it interferes with the significance of the number of employees indicator.

  43. See Putnam [31], de Blasio and Nuzzo [9].

  44. These computations use the result of the estimation of Model 1 in Table 3 and the coefficents reported in the first column of Table 4. Values are computed using variable averages over the regions and the years 1993–2006.

  45. A drawback of this approach, however, is that using stochastic frontiers requires explicit assumptions in terms of the distributions involved.

  46. In general, model (11) can be related to model (5). In particular, rearranging the estimating equation for model (5) with regional fixed effects, we have that: \( \ln \left( {rexp \_pc_{it} } \right) = \left[ {\alpha + \hbox{min} \left( {\alpha_{i} } \right)} \right] + \left[ {\alpha - \hbox{min} \left( {\alpha_{i} } \right)} \right] + {\mathbf{x}}'_{{{\mathbf{it}}}} \beta + \varepsilon_{it} \) with \( 0 \le \alpha_{i} - \hbox{min} (\alpha_{i} ) = \alpha_{{i{\text{ norm}}}} \le + \infty \), which can be directly compared to (11) where \( 0 \le u_{it} \le + \infty \) captures the inefficiency levels.

  47. So that in terms of model (5) and rearranging the time invariant fixed effects, the estimation of α i -min(α i ) is analogous to the estimation of u i .

  48. In terms of rearranging model (5) it is like writing: \( \alpha_{{it{\text{ norm}}}} = e^{ - \eta (t - T)} \alpha_{{i{\text{ norm}}}} = e^{ - \eta (t - T)} \alpha_{i} - e^{ - \eta (t - T)} (\hbox{min} (\alpha_{i} )) \) with \( \alpha_{{i{\text{ norm}}}} = 0 \) for the best unit in the sample.

  49. This specification is analagous to those discussed in Cornwell et al. [7] and Kumbhakar [25], where the authors suggest substituting a constant inefficiency parameter with a quadratic specification as in (16).

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Acknowledgments

We thank two anonymous referees for their comments, the discussants and the participants at conferences and seminars where previous versions of this work were presented, and the colleagues at the Public Finance Division of the Bank of Italy. The usual disclaimers apply.

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Correspondence to Maura Francese.

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The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Robustness checks

To check the robustness of our estimates, we run a series of exercises. We estimate model 1 using alternative estimation techniques. We start by considering a stochastic frontier modelFootnote 45 of the type:

$$ c_{it} = f(x_{it} )\xi_{it} $$
(9)

where \( \xi_{it} = 1 \) for the best unit in the sample and \( \xi_{it} > 1 \) for the others.

We specify the efficient expenditure function as

$$ f(x_{it} ) = e^{{{\text{cons}} + {\mathbf{x^{\prime}}}_{it} \beta }} $$
(10)

and hence we can write the estimating equation as

$$ \ln c_{it} = {\text{cons}} + {\mathbf{x^{\prime}}}_{it} \beta + u_{it} + \nu_{it} $$
(11)

where \( \nu_{it} {\text{ iid }}N(0,\sigma_{\nu }^{2} ) \) is the error term and \( u_{it} {\text{ iid }}N^{ + } (\mu ,\sigma_{u}^{2} ) \) captures each region’s distance with respect to the efficient frontierFootnote 46:

$$ \xi_{it} = e^{{u_{it} }} $$
(12)

Initially, we assume that the stochastic frontier is invariant over time.Footnote 47 We then consider a time varying version à la Battese and Coelli [1]:

$$ u_{it} = e^{ - \eta (t - T)} u_{i}\quad{\text{with}}\quad u_{it} {\text{iid}}N^{ + } (\mu ,\sigma_{u}^{2} ) $$
(13)

where the distance from minimum cost can be decomposed into two factors, a given level of inefficiency u i characterising each region and a time varying component, which is a function of time and a decay factor \( \eta \).

We also estimate a fixed effect model with time varying regional effects. In particular, we derive an estimating equation equivalent to the time varying stochastic frontier described above (13). In this case the expenditure equation becomesFootnote 48:\( \ln c_{it} = {\mathbf{x^{\prime}}}_{it} \beta + e^{ - \eta t} \phi_{i} + \varepsilon_{it} \) with

$$ \phi_{i} = [e^{\eta T} \alpha_{i} ] $$
(14)

Using the approximation

$$ e^{ - \eta t} \cong 1 - \eta t + \eta^{2} \frac{{t^{2} }}{2} $$
(15)

we derive the following estimating equationFootnote 49:

$$ \ln c_{it} = {\mathbf{x^{\prime}}}_{it} \beta + \phi_{i} - \eta t\phi_{i} + \eta^{2} \frac{{t^{2} \phi_{i} }}{2} + \varepsilon_{it} $$
(16)

From the estimates of (16) we can recover the parameters we are interested in: the regional (time invariant) effects α i and the decay factor η. In both time-varying models the estimated decay factor is negative and significant. This might reflect a common increasing pattern in health expenditure that could be due to the impact of technological developments in the production of healthcare, in the organisation at national level of the health system or in the structure of preferences.

Appendix 2: Indicator for the distribution of inefficiency among expenditure items

The indicator \( \vartheta_{i}^{h} \) can be rewritten as follows: \( \theta_{i}^{h} = \frac{{s_{i}^{h} \tilde{\xi }_{i}^{h} - s_{i}^{h} }}{{\xi_{i} - \xi_{{i{\text{ ref}}}} }} - s_{i}^{h} \) or

$$ \theta_{i}^{h} = s_{i}^{h} \frac{{\tilde{\xi }_{i}^{h} - \xi_{i} }}{{\xi_{i} - \xi_{{i{\text{ ref}}}} }} $$
(17)

when \( \tilde{\xi }_{i}^{h} = \xi_{i} \, \forall h \) then \( \theta_{i}^{h} = 0 \, \forall h \). All the items have the same level of inefficiency. The distortion might be very big but it is uniformly distributed among the expenditure items. On the other hand, consider a case in which all the first h–1 items are characterised by ‘full efficiency’ so that \( \tilde{\xi }_{i}^{h} = 1 \, \forall h = 1, \ldots ,H - 1 \). In this case with \( \xi_{{i{\text{ ref}}}} = \sum\limits_{h = 1}^{H} {s_{i}^{h} = 1} \), we will have \( \theta_{i}^{h} = - s_{i}^{h} \, \forall h = 1, \ldots ,H - 1 \) while the overall inefficiency will reflect the distortion in the last expenditure item: \( \theta_{i}^{H} \) will be \( > 0 > \theta_{i}^{h} \, \forall h = 1, \ldots ,H - 1 \). Given (7), we will in fact have that: \( \xi_{i} = \left( {\sum\limits_{h = 1}^{H - 1} {s_{i}^{h} } } \right) + s_{i}^{H} \tilde{\xi }_{i}^{H} \). Finally it should be noted that for items characterised by \( \tilde{\xi }_{i}^{h} > \xi_{i} , { }\theta_{i}^{h} \, \)will be positive, while for \( \tilde{\xi }_{i}^{h} < \xi_{i} , { }\theta_{i}^{h} \, \)will be negative. This means that a large distortion in a relatively small spending item might be compensated by a relatively smaller distortion in a spending item that accounts for a large fraction of total outlays.

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Francese, M., Romanelli, M. Is there room for containing healthcare costs? An analysis of regional spending differentials in Italy. Eur J Health Econ 15, 117–132 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-013-0457-4

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