Abstract
Marine resource management programs face conflicting mandates: to scale-up marine conservation efforts to cover larger areas and meet national and international conservation targets, while simultaneously to downscale and decentralize management authority to resource users and local communities. These conflicting goals create tensions in marine resource management. This paper explores these tensions by presenting and evaluating the outcomes of a fisheries co-management program on the island of Pemba, Tanzania, where institutions and scale were configured and reconfigured under externally funded programs to improve marine conservation through co-management. The initial institutional arrangements for co-management supported a functioning system to protect marine resources, ensure fishermen’s access, and distribute tourism revenues. However, a subsequent push to scale-up marine management reconfigured institutional arrangements and power in a more hierarchical and potentially weaker system. With the expansion of the co-management program, protected area coverage, financial resources, and the number of community organizations created for fisheries co-management expanded tremendously; however, community participation in marine management decreased, and the fishermen’s association previously involved in co-management dissolved. Several factors contributed to this outcome: inadequate time to solidify co-management institutions and arrangements, diverse resource users inexperienced with local management, a sudden and substantial new source of funding, and political pressures to restructure marine management. Rather than focusing primarily on expanding coverage and devolving authority, it is important to adapt co-management arrangements to the local contexts in which they operate.
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Notes
This acronym is currently used by another MPA in Zanzibar, the Mnemba Island–Chwaka Bay Marine Conservation Area, established at a later date.
The term “fishermen” is used throughout the manuscript and includes both men and women who were regularly involved in fishing and marine resource harvesting for livelihood purposes.
The interviews were conducted as part of a larger research project examining MPAs in Zanzibar.
Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous state of the URT, thus able to set its own targets for marine protection; however, total area under protection in Zanzibar is counted toward the total protected area for the URT.
Andrew Cooke, former Misali Project Manager under EDG, personal communication, 2001.
The forests on Misali Island remained under the jurisdiction of DCCFF, but the MPA no longer fell under the agency’s authority.
Ali Said Hamad, former DoF officer involved with MIMCA and PECCA, personal communication, 2014.
Shehias are a political unit that is similar to the village level, as villages are not a formal unit of governance in Zanzibar. A shehia can include a single village, or multiple villages in close proximity.
All quotes were taken during focus group discussions and translated from the original Swahili by the author.
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Acknowledgments
This research was funded through a fellowship from the Aspen Institute for nonprofit sector research, a Rocca fellowship from U.C. Berkeley’s Center for African Studies, and a Foreign Language Areas Study Fellowship from the US Department of Education. Many thanks go to the program officials from CARE Zanzibar, MICA, DCCFF, and DoF for taking the time to speak with me and for their assistance in research logistics. Additional thanks go to the rangers of Misali Island and the many many fishermen who agreed to be interviewed for this project. Much appreciation goes to Jim Anderson, who referred me to additional project documents after the completion of MACEMP and reviewed a manuscript draft. In particular, infinite thanks go to Hajj. M. Hajj, who assisted with interviews, focus groups, and transcription, and who was the best research assistant I could ever hope to have.
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Editor: James Pittock.
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Levine, A. The development and unraveling of marine resource co-management in the Pemba Channel, Zanzibar: institutions, governance, and the politics of scale. Reg Environ Change 16, 1279–1291 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-015-0856-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-015-0856-4