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Efficient lottery design

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Abstract

There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms that have proven to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used in real life for indivisible goods allocation. To help facilitate the design of practical lottery mechanisms, we provide new tools for obtaining stochastic improvements in lotteries. As applications, we propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the widely used random serial dictatorship mechanism and a lottery representation of its competitor, the probabilistic serial mechanism. The tools we provide here can be useful in developing welfare-enhanced new lottery mechanisms for practical applications such as school choice.

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Notes

  1. Indeed we are not aware of any stochastic mechanisms in use for any practical assignment problem.

  2. PS treats each object as a continuum of probability shares and allows agents to simultaneously “eat away” from their favorite objects at the same speed until each agent has eaten a total of 1 probability share. The share of an object an agent has eaten during the process represents the probability with which she assigned the object by PS. See Sect. 5 for a more precise description.

  3. For example, as far as we are aware, a nontrivial lottery mechanism satisfying sd-efficiency (or the stronger ex-ante efficiency) is yet to be reported or studied. Additionally imposing strategy-proofness readily leads to impossibilities (Zhou 1990; Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001).

  4. Budish et al. (2013) develop tools for handling complex constraints while working directly with stochastic mechanisms.

  5. See Example 3 of Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003a).

  6. Improving upon a “status quo” allocation (or a partial allocation) while respecting other considerations has been a common goal in various applications of indivisible goods allocation. Examples of applications include housing markets, on-campus housing, kidney exchange, and school choice. All these applications, however, have focused on achieving ex post properties.

  7. In a related paper, Manea (2008) shows the existence of lotteries that improve upon the RSD outcome. Differently than here, his approach is based on working directly with stochastic assignments.

  8. The reason for this will be clear when relating the sd-efficiency of a lottery with the Pareto efficiency of an assignment in a replica economy in the next section.

  9. This tractability assumption holds generally in practice and is satisfied by lotteries induced by all well-known mechanisms.

  10. See Hugh-Jones et al. (2014) for an experimental evaluation of PS.

  11. Simply apply the TTC to the problem where the support of the lottery is interpreted as an extended housing market with endowments. Then the following is easy to show. The support of the lottery is Pareto efficient if and only if the TTC algorithm generates only self-cycles.

  12. Because of its appealing efficiency and incentive features, a number of mechanisms based on the TTC method have been proposed and characterized for a variety of applications such as on-campus housing, school choice, and kidney exchange. Although for deterministic settings, all proposed TTC based mechanisms are Pareto efficient, little is known about the applicability of this procedure to the stochastic assignment context or its relation to sd-efficiency, for that matter. An exception is Kesten (2009) who shows that if a simple version of the TTC method is applied to a market in which each agent is initially endowed with an equal probability share of each object, then the resulting outcome is sd-efficient and coincides with that of PS.

  13. It is quite challenging to check whether or not the TRSD\(^{K}\) is sd-strategy-proof, for the following reasons. First, BM’s and Nesterov’s (2014) impossibility theorems show the incompatibility of sd-strategy-proofness, sd-efficiency, and equal treatment of equals for problems with unit quotas. Thus their results are not applicable since TRSD\(^{K}\) is not necessarily sd-efficient in general, and nor does our setting assume unit quotas. Second, we need at least four agents for the outcomes of RSD and TRSD\(^{K}\) to differ, which makes it cumbersome to calculate the stochastic assignments of TRSD\(^{K}\).

  14. In fact, we can show a more general result in which any sd-efficient stochastic assignment (and not only PS) can be represented as an equal-weight lottery using the same algorithm.

  15. This step is missing in the example since all priorities have the same weight.

  16. For a general case of an arbitrary sd-efficient assignment, objects can also be relabeled according to the exhausting order, although the underlying eating algorithm proceeds not using constant eating speed functions but some other profile of eating speed functions (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001). Alternatively, we can order the objects using the following hierarchical procedure: at each step agents point to their most preferred object among the remaining objects and we choose the most popular object (choose one of them arbitrarily if there are several) to be the next in our order of objects. Intuitively, this ordering of objects is similar to the exhausting order in the eating algorithm: at each step j the agents in \(E(a_{j})\) prefer object \(a_{j}\) over the remaining objects. This is the key feature of the ordering \(l_{ex}\) in our lottery decomposition.

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Correspondence to Onur Kesten.

Additional information

We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and seminar participants at various universities and conferences for useful discussions. Morimitsu Kurino acknowledges the financial support from Maastricht University when he was affiliated there. All remaining errors are our own.

Appendix

Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1

Let \(L=\sum _{s\in S}w_{s}\mu _{s}\) be a lottery. The lemma is obvious if S is a singleton. Thus, suppose not. Without loss of generality, let \(S=\left\{ 1,\ldots ,|S|\right\} \). By (L2) and (L3), for some \(n\in \mathbb {N}\), for each \(s\in S\), there is \(m_{s}\in \mathbb {N}\) such that \(w_{s}=m_{s}/n\) and \(\sum _{s\in S}m_{s}=n\). Then, \(\pi (L)=\pi \left( \sum _{s\in S}\frac{m_{s}}{n}\mu _{s}\right) =\pi [\frac{1}{n}\sum _{s\in S}(\overbrace{\mu _{s}+\ldots +\mu _{s}}^{m_{s}})]\). We iteratively define a collection of sets, \(\left\{ M_{s}\right\} _{s\in S}\): \(M_{1}=\left\{ 1,\ldots ,m_{1}\right\} \), for \(s\ge 2\), \(M_{s}=\left\{ \sum _{k=1}^{s-1}m_{k}+1,\ldots ,\sum _{k=1}^{s-1}m_{k}+m_{s}\right\} \). Moreover, let \(M=\cup _{s\in S}M_{s}\). Also, we define a collection of assignments, \((\nu _{m})_{m\in M}\) as follows: for each \(m\in M\), since there is a unique \(s\in S\) with \(m\in M_{s}\), let \(\nu _{m}=\mu _{s}\). Then, the lottery \(\frac{1}{n}\sum _{m\in M}\nu _{m}\) is of equal weights and equivalent to L. \(\square \)

Proof of Claim 1

Part (1) is obvious by construction of \(B^{t}(\cdot )\).

Part (2) Let \(t\in \left\{ 0\right\} \cup \mathbb {N}\). Suppose \(B^{t}(\left\{ a\right\} )\cap X=\emptyset \), but \(B^{t}(\left\{ a\right\} )=B^{t+1}(\left\{ a\right\} )\). Let \(\left\{ i_{1},\ldots ,i_{M}\right\} :=\left\{ i\in I\mathrel {|}\mu _{S}(1,i)\in B^{t}(\left\{ a\right\} )\right\} \), and for each \(m\in \left\{ 1,\ldots ,M\right\} \), let \(a_{m}:=\mu (1,i_{m})\in B^{t}\left\{ a\right\} \). Since \(B^{t}(\left\{ a\right\} )\cap X=\emptyset \), \(a_{m}\not \in X\), i.e., for each \(m\in \left\{ 1,\ldots ,M\right\} \), \(|\mu _{1}^{-1}(a_{m})|\ge q_{a_{m}}\). This inequality is strict for at least one m, as \(\left\{ a\right\} \in B^{t}(\left\{ a\right\} )\) and \(|\mu _{1}^{-1}(a)|>q_{a}\). Thus, \(\sum _{a\in \left\{ a_{1},\ldots ,a_{m}\right\} }|\mu _{1}^{-1}(a)|=\sum _{m=1}^{M}|\mu _{1}^{-1}(a_{m})|>\sum _{m=1}^{M}q_{a_{m}}\ge \sum _{a\in \left\{ a_{1},\ldots ,a_{m}\right\} }q_{a}\), which contradicts the feasibility of \(\mu _{S}\).

Part (3) If the claim is not true, we have \(\left\{ a\right\} \subsetneq B^{1}(\left\{ a\right\} )\subsetneq \cdots \subsetneq B^{t}(\left\{ a\right\} )\subsetneq \ldots \), which contradicts the finiteness of A. \(\square \)

To prove Theorems 1 and Part (2) of Theorem 3, we need the following notion and lemma.

Definition 5

Let \(\succ \in \mathbf {P}^{N}\) and \(P,R\in \mathcal {S}\). A temporary list of size \(\varvec{m}\) is \((a^{1},i^{1},\ldots ,a^{m},i^{m},a^{m+1})\) such that for each \(\ell \in \left\{ 1,\ldots ,m\right\} \), (1) \(a^{\ell +1}\mathrel {\succ _{i^{\ell }}}a^{l}\), (2) \(p_{i^{\ell },a^{\ell }}<r_{i^{\ell },a^{\ell }}\), (3) \(p_{i^{\ell },a^{\ell +1}}>r_{i^{\ell },a^{\ell +1}}\), and (4) \(a^{1},\ldots ,a^{m}\) are distinct. An improvement cycle from R to P is a temporary list of size m, \((a^{1},i^{1},\ldots ,a^{m},i^{m},a^{m+1})\) , such that \(a^{m+1}=a^{1}\).

Lemma 5

Let \(\succ \in \mathbf {P}^{N}\), \(i\in N\), and \(P,R\in \mathcal {S}\) be non-wasteful at \(\succ \). Suppose that P stochastically dominates R at \(\succ \). Then there is an improvement cycle from R to P.

Proof of Claim 1

We first construct a temporary list of size 1, \((a^{1},i^{1},a^{2})\), where \(a^{1}\) and \(a^{2}\) are distinct. Since \(P\ne R\), there is \(i^{1}\in N\) such that \(P_{i^{1}}\ne R_{i^{1}}\). Thus, since \(P_{i^{1}}\) stochastically dominates \(R_{i^{1}}\) at \(\succ _{i^{1}}\), there are \(a^{1},a^{2}\in A\) such that \(a^{2}\mathrel {\succ _{i^{1}}}a^{1}\), \(p_{i^{1},a^{2}}>r_{i^{1},a^{2}}\), and \(p_{i^{1},a^{1}}<r_{i^{1},a^{1}}\). Thus \(a_{1}\ne a_{2}\). Then \((a^{1},i^{1},a^{2})\) is the desired list.

Suppose we are given a temporary list of size m, \((a^{1},i^{1},\ldots ,a^{m-1},i^{m-1},a^{m})\), where \(a^{1},\ldots ,a^{m}\) are distinct. Then (1) \(a^{m}\mathrel {\succ _{i^{m-1}}}a^{m-1}\), (2) \(p_{i^{m-1},a^{m-1}}<r_{i^{m-1},a^{m-1}}\), and (3) \(p_{i^{m-1},a^{m}}>r_{i^{m-1},a^{m}}\). Then, since \(r_{i^{m-1},a^{m-1}}>p_{i^{m-1},a^{m-1}}\ge 0\), by the feasibility of P and non-wastefulness of R, we have \(\sum _{j\in N}p_{j,a^{m}}\le q_{a^{m}}=\sum _{j\in N}r_{j,a^{m}}\). Thus, since \(p_{i^{m-1},a^{m}}>r_{i^{m-1},a^{m}}\), there is \(i^{m}\in N\) such that \(p_{i^{m},a^{m}}<r_{i^{m},a^{m}}\). Thus, since \(P_{i^{m}}\) stochastically dominates \(R_{i^{m}}\) at \(\succ _{i^{m}}\), there is \(a^{m+1}\in A\) such that \(a^{m+1}\mathrel {\succ _{i^{m}}}a^{m}\) and \(p_{i^{m},a^{m+1}}>r_{i^{m},a^{m+1}}\). Thus \((a^{1},i^{1},\ldots ,a^{m},i^{m},a^{m+1})\) is a temporary size of m. Then, if \(a^{m+1}=a^{\ell }\) for some \(\ell \in \{1,\ldots ,m\}\), then the list \((a^{\ell },i^{\ell },\ldots ,a^{m},i^{m},a^{m+1})\) is an improvement cycle from R to P. Otherwise we continue this process. However, since |A| is finite, we eventually obtain an improvement cycle from R to P. \(\square \)

Proof of Theorem 1

Let L be a lottery with the support \(\mu _{S}\): (\(\Rightarrow \)) We show the contrapositive. Suppose that the support \(\mu _{S}\) of L is not Pareto efficient at \(\succ _{S}\). Then there is an \(|S|-\)fold replica assignment \(\nu _{S}\) that Pareto dominates \(\mu _{S}\) at \(\succ _{S}\). As in Lemma 1, there is an equal-weight lottery \(L^{e}=(1/|M|)\sum _{m\in M}\mu _{m}^{\prime }\) that is equivalent to L such that for each \(m\in M\) there is a unique \(s(m)\in S\) with \(\mu _{m}^{\prime }=\mu _{s(m)}\). Now we define an \(|S|-\)fold replica assignment \(\nu _{M}^{\prime }\): for \(m\in M\), \(\nu _{m}^{\prime }=\nu _{s(m)}\). Then, \(\nu _{M}^{\prime }\) Pareto dominates \(\mu _{M}^{\prime }\) at \(\succ _{M}\). By Lemma 3, the equal-weight lottery with the support \(\nu _{M}^{\prime }\) stochastically dominates the equal-weight lottery \(\mu _{M}^{\prime }\) at \(\succ \). Thus L is not sd-efficient at \(\succ \).

(\(\Leftarrow \)) We show the contrapositive. Suppose that L is wasteful (and thus not sd-efficient) at \(\succ \). Let \(R=\pi (L)\) be the stochastic assignment induced by L. Then there is \(i\in N\), \(a\in A\) with \(r_{i,a}>0\), and \(b\in A\) with \(b\mathrel {\succ _{i}}a\) such that \(\sum _{j\in N}r_{j,b}<q_{b}\). As \(r_{i,a}>0\), there is \(s\in S\) such that \(\mu _{s}(i_{s})=a\). Then, let \(\nu _{s}\) be an \(s-\)replica assignment such that \(\nu _{s}(i_{s})=b\) and for each \(j\in N\), \(\nu _{s}(j_{s})=\mu _{s}(j_{s})\). Then, the \(|S|-\)fold replica assignment \((\nu _{s},\mu _{S\setminus \left\{ s\right\} })\) Pareto dominates \(\mu _{s}\) at \(\succ _{S}\).

Suppose that L is non-wasteful but not sd-efficient at \(\succ \). Then, there is a stochastic assignment \(P\ne R\) that stochastically dominates R at \(\succ \). By Lemma 5, there is an improvement cycle, denoted by \((a^{1},i^{1},\ldots ,a^{m},i^{m})\), from R to P. Then, we can find indices \(s^{1},\ldots ,s^{m}\in S\) such that \(\mu _{s^{1}}(i^{1})=a^{1},\ldots ,\mu _{s^{m}}(i^{m})=a^{m}\). Then, define an \(|S|-\)fold replica assignment \(\nu _{S}\) such that \(\nu _{s^{1}}(i^{1})=a^{2},\ldots ,\nu _{s^{m-1}}(i^{m-1})=a^{m},\nu _{s^{m}}(i^{m})=a^{1}\), and any other agent is assigned the same object as in \(\mu \). Then, \(\nu _{S}\) Pareto dominates \(\mu _{S}\) at \(\succ _{S}\). \(\square \)

Proof of Theorem 3

We first show that TRSD\(^{K}\) satisfies the equal treatment of equals. Let \(i,j\in N\) with \(i\ne j\) and \(\succ \) a problem with \(\succ _{i}=\succ _{j}\). For each priority f we define another priority \(f^{i\leftrightarrow j}\) to be the priority where only the positions of i and j under f are switched and the other agents have the same positions as in f. Note that the size of the support is \(|\mathcal {F}(K)|\times K\times K\). Consider the lottery of the TRSD\(^{K}\) after \(F(K)=\left\{ f_{1},\ldots ,f_{K}\right\} \in \mathcal {F}(K)\) is selected. Then agents face lottery \(\frac{1}{K}\sum _{g\in F(K)}TTC_{F(K)}(\succ _{F(K)},SD_{F(K)}(\succ );g)\). Consider \(F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K):=\left\{ f_{1}^{i\leftrightarrow j},\ldots ,f_{K}^{i\leftrightarrow j}\right\} \) and the lottery \(\frac{1}{K}\sum _{g\in F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)}TTC_{F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)}(\succ _{F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)},SD_{F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)}(\succ );g)\). Since the positions of agent i and j are just reversed, the resulting lotteries are the same except that agent i and j’s stochastic assignments are switched. That is, we have

$$\begin{aligned}&\frac{1}{K}\sum _{g\in F(K)}TTC_{F(K)}(\succ _{F(K)},SD_{F(K)}(\succ );g)(i)\\&\quad =\frac{1}{K}\sum _{g\in F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)}TTC_{F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)}(\succ _{F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)},SD_{F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)}(\succ );g)(j). \end{aligned}$$

Now, there exist nonempty and disjoint sets \(\mathcal {H}\) and \(\mathcal {H}^{\prime }\) such that \(\mathcal {H}\cup \mathcal {H}^{\prime }=\mathcal {F}(K)\) and for each \(F(K)\in \mathcal {H}\), \(F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)\in \mathcal {H}^{\prime }\). Then, using the above equation and letting \(\varphi (F(K),g)=\frac{1}{K}TTC[\succ _{F(K)},SD_{F(K)}(\succ );g]\),

$$\begin{aligned} TRSD^{K}(\succ )(i)\equiv & {} \frac{1}{\genfrac(){0.0pt}1{n!}{K}}\sum _{F(K)\in \mathcal {F}(K)}\sum _{g\in F(K)}\varphi (F(K),g)(i)\\= & {} \frac{1}{\genfrac(){0.0pt}1{n!}{K}}\sum _{F(K)\in \mathcal {F}(K)}\sum _{g\in F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)}\varphi (F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K),g)(j)\\= & {} \frac{1}{\genfrac(){0.0pt}1{n!}{K}}\sum _{F(K)\in \mathcal {H}}\sum _{g\in F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)}\varphi (F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K),g)(j)\\&\quad +\frac{1}{\genfrac(){0.0pt}1{n!}{K}}\sum _{F(K)\in \mathcal {H}^{\prime }}\sum _{g\in F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)}\varphi (F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K),g)(j)\\= & {} \frac{1}{\genfrac(){0.0pt}1{n!}{K}}\sum _{F(K)\in \mathcal {H}^{\prime }}\sum _{g\in F(K)}\varphi (F(K),g)(j)\\&\quad +\frac{1}{\genfrac(){0.0pt}1{n!}{K}}\sum _{F(K)\in \mathcal {H}}\sum _{g\in F(K)}\varphi (F(K),g)(j)\\= & {} \frac{1}{\genfrac(){0.0pt}1{n!}{K}}\sum _{F(K)\in \mathcal {F}(K)}\sum _{g\in F(K)}\varphi (F(K),g)(j)=TRSD^{K}(\succ )(k). \end{aligned}$$

The equality of the first term in the second and third line comes from the following: [\(F(K)\in \mathcal {H}\text { and }g\in F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)\)] \(\Leftrightarrow \) [\(F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)\in \mathcal {H}^{\prime }\) and \(g\in F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)\)] \(\Leftrightarrow \) [\(F^{\prime }(K)\in \mathcal {H}^{\prime }\) and \(h\in \mathcal {H}^{\prime }\)]. Similarly, the equality of the second term in the second and third line comes from the following: [\(F(K)\in \mathcal {H}^{\prime }\) and \(g\in F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)\)] \(\Leftrightarrow \) [\(F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)\in \mathcal {H}\) and \(g\in F^{i\leftrightarrow j}(K)\)] \(\Leftrightarrow \) [\(F^{\prime }(K)\in \mathcal {H}\) and \(h\in F^{\prime }(K)\)]. Hence, the TRSD\(^{K}\) satisfies the equal treatment of equals. \(\square \)

Part (1) Note that to show that \(TRSD^{K}\) stochastically dominates RSD, we need to show that for some problem \(\succ \), \(TRSD^{K}\ne RSD\) due to the weakly stochastic dominance just proved above. If \(|N|\le 3\), then RSD is sd-efficient (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001), and thus \(TRSD^{K}=RSD\). Suppose \(|N|\ge 4\). Example 3 shows that for \(|N|=4\), \(TRSD^{K}\ne RSD\). The extension to the case of \(|N|\ge 5\) is straightforward.

Part (2) Suppose RSD is not sd-efficient for some N, A, and q. Then there is a problem \(\succ \) such that \(RSD(\succ )\) is not sd-efficient at \(\succ \). Let \(R:=RSD(\succ )\). We first show

Claim 2

there exist \(\bar{K}\le n\) and \(F(\bar{K}):=\{f_{1},\ldots ,f_{\bar{K}}\}\) such that \(SD_{F(\bar{K})}(\succ )\) is not Pareto efficient in the |K|-fold replica problem. First consider the case where R is wasteful at \(\succ \). Then there is \(i\in N\), \(a\in A\) with \(r_{i,a}>0\), and \(b\in A\) with \(b\mathrel {\succ _{i}}a\) such that \(\sum _{j\in N}r_{j,b}<q_{b}\). Then there is \(f_{1},f_{2}\in F\) such that \(SD_{f_{1}}(\succ )(i)=a\) and \(\sum _{j\in N}|SD_{f_{2}}(\succ )(j)|<q_{b}\). Take \(\bar{K}=2\) and \(F(\bar{K}):=\{f_{1},f_{2}\}\). Then \(SD_{F(\bar{K})}(\succ )\) is not Pareto efficient at \(\succ \). Consider another case where R is non-wasteful but not sd-efficient at \(\succ \). Then there is a stochastic assignment P such that P stochastically dominates R at \(\succ \). Then, by Lemma 5, there is an improvement cycle \((a^{1},i^{1},a^{2},i^{2},\ldots ,a^{m},i^{m},a^{m+1})\) from R to P. Let \(\bar{K}:=m\). Then, since \(a^{1},\ldots ,a^{m}\) are distinct, we have \(\bar{K}\le |A|\). Moreover, since \(r_{i^{\ell },a^{\ell }}>0\) for each \(\ell \in \{1,\ldots ,m\}\), there is \(F(\bar{K}):=\{f_{1},\ldots ,f_{\bar{K}}\}\), where \(F(\bar{K})\) allows for duplicate elements, such that for each \(\ell \in \{1,\ldots ,m\}\), \(SD_{f_{k}}(\succ )(i^{\ell })=a^{\ell }\). Then an assignment \(\nu \) where for each \(i\in \{1,\ldots ,m\}\), \(\nu (i^{\ell })=a^{\ell +1}\), Pareto dominates \(SD_{F(\bar{K})}(\succ )\). Hence \(SD_{F(\bar{K})}\) is not Pareto efficient at \(\succ \). Thus the proof of Claim 2 is completed.

Let \(K\ge \bar{K}\). Then there is \(F(K)\subseteq F\) such that \(F(\bar{K})\subseteq F(K)\). Then, by Claim 2, \(SD_{F(K)}(\succ )\) is not Pareto efficient. Thus, since \(TRSD_{F(K)}(\succ _{F(K)},SD_{F(K)};g)\) for some \(g\in F\) is Pareto efficient, we have \(TRSD_{F(K)}(\succ _{F(K)},SD_{F(K)};g)\ne SD_{F(K)}(\succ )\). Therefore \(TRSD^{K}\ne SD\).

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Kesten, O., Kurino, M. & Nesterov, A.S. Efficient lottery design. Soc Choice Welf 48, 31–57 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0978-8

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