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Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games

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Abstract

We define multilinear extensions for multichoice games and relate them to probabilistic values and semivalues. We apply multilinear extensions to show that the Banzhaf value for a compound multichoice game is not the product of the Banzhaf values of the component games, in contrast to the behavior in simple games. Following Owen (Manag Sci 18:64–79, 1972), we integrate the multilinear extension over a simplex to construct a version of the Shapley value for multichoice games. We compare this new Shapley value to other extensions of the Shapley value to multichoice games. We also show how the probabilistic value (resp. semivalue, Banzhaf value, Shapley value) of a multichoice game is equal to the probabilistic value (resp. semivalue, Banzhaf value, Shapley value) of an appropriately defined TU decomposition game. Finally, we explain how semivalues, probabilistic values, the Banzhaf value, and this Shapley value may be viewed as the probability that a player makes a difference to the outcome of a simple multichoice game.

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Correspondence to Michael A. Jones.

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Jones, M.A., Wilson, J.M. Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games. Math Meth Oper Res 72, 145–169 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-010-0313-6

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