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An equivalent definition of stable Equilibria

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Abstract.

Characterisations of stable equilibria in terms of the best reply correspondence are given.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, N6A 5C2, Canada

    Srihari Govindan

  2. Université Catholique Louvain, Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Jean-François Mertens

Authors
  1. Srihari Govindan
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  2. Jean-François Mertens
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jean-François Mertens.

Additional information

Received January 2003

JEL Classification: C72, C73.

1991 Mathematics Subject Classification: 90D05, 90D10, 90D20

This work was supported in part by N.S.F. Grant #SES 8922610.

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Govindan, S., Mertens, JF. An equivalent definition of stable Equilibria. Int J Game Theory 32, 339–357 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400165

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400165

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