Abstract.
We consider repeated games with complete information and imperfect monitoring, where each player is assigned a fixed subset of players and only observes the moves chosen by the players in this subset. This structure is naturally represented by a directed graph. We prove that a generalized folk theorem holds for any payoff function if and only if the graph is 2-connected, and then extend this result to the context of finitely repeated games.
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Received June 1997/Revised version March 1998
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Renault, J., Tomala, T. Repeated proximity games. Game Theory 27, 539–559 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050089
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050089