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See, for example, D. M. Armstrong's book Perception and the Physical World, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961, pp. 19–27.
For a summary of evidence relating to this point, see K. U. Smith and W. M. Smith, Perception and Motion, W. B. Saunders Company, Philadelphia and London, 1962, especially Ch. VII.
He expresses this question by asking “What are the immediate objects of awareness in perception?”, Perception and the Physical World, Ch. 2, and he explains that “immediate perception is perception which involves no element of inference” (p. 21).
Perception and the Physical World, p. 105.
This line of defence is taken in D. M. Armstrong, Bodily Sensations, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1962, Chs. 15 and 16. It is elaborated at much greater length in his forthcoming book defending a physicalist theory of mind which is also to be published by Routledge and Kegan Paul. See especially the chapter entitled ‘The Secondary Qualities’.
See Perception and the Physical World, especially Chs. 7 and 9.
Bodily Sensations, p. 116.
F. Rosenblatt, Principles of Neurodynamics, Spartan Books, Washington, D. C., 1962.
For some recent evidence relating to this point see W. C. H. Prentice, ‘Aftereffects in Perception’, Scientific American 206 No. 1 (January, 1962) 44–9.
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Ellis, B. Physical monism. Synthese 17, 141–161 (1967). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485024
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485024