Abstract
In this article, we model the effect of foreign policy attitudes on both vote choice and casualty tolerance, using survey data collected during the 2004 election. We show that prospective judgments of the likelihood of success in Iraq and retrospective judgments of whether the war in Iraq was right are significant determinants of both vote choice and casualty tolerance. The prospective judgment of success is key in predicting casualty tolerance, while retrospective judgment of whether the war was right takes precedence in determining vote choice. In addition, there is an important interaction between the two variables, so the effect of one is conditional on the value of the other. We believe this is compelling evidence that foreign policy matters, and that it matters in reasonable ways.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Truman was eligible to run but withdrew after losing in the New Hampshire primary to Estes Kefauver. Johnson announced his decision not to run for reelection after the Tet offensive in Vietnam prompted challenges from Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy.
Some members of the public might also be insensitive to casualties because they are opposed to the use of military force regardless of the number of U.S. casualties—that is some portion of the public opposes the use of force even it results in no U.S. casualties. We account for this possibility in our measurement of casualty tolerance.
Gallup does not have apples-to-apples data for 1988. In most years, the “most important problem” question allows respondents to mention more than one problem, i.e. the same respondent could say both “the economy” and “foreign affairs.” Because of the multiple responses, the cumulative total of the marginals exceeds 100%, sometimes by a wide margin. In 1988, Gallup used a single response format. In the single response format, 9% mention something related to foreign affairs or defense policy as the most important problem. This proportion is still more than double what was reported in the multiple response format during the 1990s.
The surveys were conducted by Knowledge Networks, which maintains a panel of respondents recruited through Random Digit Dialing (RDD), who are equipped with WebTV and complete surveys online. Detailed sampling information is available from the company website, http://www.knowledgenetworks.com. Studies have found that the Knowledge Networks sampling methodology yields representative samples (Couper, 2000; Krosnick & Chang, Unpublished typescript), with results comparable to RDD telephone surveys.
We adopt the “Pottery Barn” label from Friedman.
The results in Table 4 are estimated from models not presented here (though available online). In these models, we condense the four point scales in RightThing and Success to dummy variables, and use the dummy variables as predictors. Results are substantively identical. We explain these choices in more detail in the discussion section.
References
Aldrich, J. (1977). Electoral choice in 1972: A test of some theorems of the spatial model of electoral competition. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 5, 215–237.
Aldrich, J., Sullivan, J., & Borgida, E. (1989). Foreign affairs and issue voting: Do presidential candidates ‘waltz before a blind audience?’ American Political Science Review, 83(1), 123–141.
Almond, G. (1950). The American people and foreign policy. New York: Praeger.
Berinsky, A. (2007). Assuming the costs of war: Events, elites, and American public support for military conflict. Journal of Politics, 69(4).
Boettcher, W., & Cobb, M. (2006). Echoes of Vietnam?: Casualty framing and public perceptions of success and failure in Iraq. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(1), 831–854.
Brody, R. A., & Page, B. I. (1972). Comment: The assessment of policy voting. American Political Science Review, 66(2), 450–458.
Burk, J. (1999). Public support for peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the casualties hypothesis. Political Science Quarterly, 114(1), 53–78.
Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1960). The American voter. New York: Wiley.
Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. Apter (Ed.), Ideology and discontent. New York: Free Press.
Couper, M. P. (2000). Web surveys: A review of issues and approaches. Public Opinion Quarterly, 64, 464–494.
Destler, I. M., & Kull, S. (1999). Misreading the public: The myth of a new isolationism. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Eichenberg, R. C. (2005). Victory has many friends: The American public and the use of military force, 1981–2004. International Security, 30(1), 140–177.
Elder, J., & Nagourney, A. (2003). A nation at war; POLL; Opinions begin to shift as public weighs cost of war. New York Times March 26.
Evans, G., & Andersen, R. (2006). The political conditioning of economic perceptions. Journal of Politics, 68(1), 194–207.
Feaver, P. D., & Gelpi, C. (2004). Choosing your battles: American civil-military relations and the use of force. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Fiorina, M. P. (1981). Retrospective voting in American national elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Gelpi, C., Feaver, P. D., & Reifler, J. (2005/2006). Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq. International Security, 30(3), 7–46.
Holsti, O. R. (1997). Public opinion and American foreign policy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Hurwitz, J., & Peffley, M. (1987a). How are foreign policy attitudes structured? A hierarchical model. American Political Science Review, 81(4), 1099–1120.
Hurwitz, J., & Peffley, M. (1987b). The means and ends of foreign policy as determinants of presidential support. American Journal of Political Science, 31(2), 236–258.
Hyde, C. K. (2000). Casualty aversion: Implications for policymakers and senior military officers. Aerospace Power Journal, 14(2), 17–27.
Jentleson, B. W. (1992). The pretty prudent public: Post-Vietnam American opinion on the use of military force. International Studies Quarterly, 36(2), 49–74.
Jentleson, B., & Britton, R. L. (1998). Still pretty prudent. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(4).
Johnson, D., & Tierney, D. (2006). Failing to win: Perceptions of victory and defeat in international politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kiewiet, D. R. (1983). Macroeconomics and micropolitics: The electoral effects of economic issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kinder, D., & Kiewiet, D. R. (1979). Economic grievances and political behavior: The role of personal discontents and collective judgments in congressional voting. American Journal of Political Science, 23, 495–527.
Kinder, D., & Kiewiet, D. R. (1981). Sociotropic politics: The American case. British Journal of Political Science, 11, 129–161.
Klarevas, L. J. (2000). The polls-trends: The United States peace operation in Somalia. Public Opinion Quarterly, 64(4), 523–540.
Lane C. (1998). Casualty attitude. New Republic, 219(17), 6.
Larson, E. (1996). Casualties and consensus: The historical role of casualties in domestic support for U.S. military operations. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
Lewis-Beck, M. (2006). Does economics still matter? Econometrics and the vote. Journal of Politics, 68(1), 208–212.
Luttwak, E. (1994). Where are the great powers? Foreign Affairs, 73(4), 23–28.
Luttwak, E. (1996). A post-heroic military policy. Foreign Affairs, 75(4), 33–44.
Moskos, C. (1995). Grave decision: When Americans feel more at ease accepting the casualties of war. Chicago Tribune December 12, p. 25.
Mueller, J. (1973). War, presidents, and public opinion. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Nickelsburg, M. J., & Norpoth, H. (2000). Commander-in-chief or chief economist? The president in the eye of the public. Electoral Studies, 19, 313–322.
Nincic, M. & Hinkley, B. (1992). Foreign policy and the evaluation of presidential candidates. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35, 333–355.
Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2006). Why are political misperceptions so difficult to correct? Paper presented at American Political Science Association annual meeting, Philadelphia, PA, September, 1, 2006.
Peffley, M., & Hurwitz, J. (1993). Models of attitude constraint in foreign affairs. Political Behavior, 15(1), 61–90.
Purdum, T. S. (2003). A nation at war: The casualties; delicate calculus of casualties and public opinion. New York Times March 27, B1.
Record, J. (2000). Force-protection: Fetishism sources, consequences, and (?) solutions. Aerospace Power Journal, 14(2), 411.
Reifler, J. (nd). Causes and consequences of exposure to different news source. Unpublished typescript.
Ricks, T. E. (2003). U.S. casualties expose risks, raise doubts about strategy. Washington Post March 24, p. 1.
Sapolsky, H. M., & Shapiro, J. (1996). Casualties, technology, and America’s future wars. Parameters, 26(2), 119–126.
Shapiro, R. Y., & Page, B. I. (1988). Foreign policy and the rational public. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32(2), 211–247.
Stokes, D. E. (1966). Some dynamic elements of contests for the presidency. American Political Science Review, 60, 19–28.
Tomz, M. (2007). Domestic audience costs in international relations: An experimental approach. International Organization, Forthcoming.
Wilcox, C., & Allsop, D. (1991). Economic and foreign policy as sources of Reagan support. The Western Political Quarterly, 44(4), 941–958.
Witko, C. (2003). Cold war belligerence and U.S. public opinion toward defense spending. American Politics Research, 31(4), 379–403.
Wittkopf, E. R. (1990). Faces of internationalism: Public opinion and American foreign policy. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
Wlezien, C. (1995). The Public as thermostat: Dynamics of preferences for spending. American Journal of Political Science, 39(4), 981–1000.
Wlezien, C. (1996). Dynamics of representation: The case of US spending on defence. British Journal of Political Science, 26(1), 81–103.
Zaller, J. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Acknowledgments
This work is supported by grants from the Carnegie Corporation and the National Science Foundation. The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer, the editors of Political Behavior, John Aldrich, and seminar participants at Duke University for their helpful comments.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendix
Appendix
Most Important Issue: Respondents were asked “When choosing for whom to vote, which of the following issues are most important to you personally?” Answer categories were “Foreign policy issues like Iraq and the War on Terrorism,” “Economic issues like jobs and taxes,” and “Social issues like abortion and gay marriage.”
RightThing: Respondents were asked, “We would like to know whether you think President Bush did the right thing by using military force against Iraq. Would you say that you strongly approve, somewhat approve, some what disapprove or strongly disapprove of his decision?” [Strongly approve = 3, Somewhat approve = 2, Somewhat disapprove = 1, Strongly disapprove = 0].
Success: Respondents were asked, “Regardless of whether you think that the President did the right thing, would you say that the U.S. is very likely succeed in Iraq, somewhat likely to succeed, not very likely to succeed, or not at all likely to succeed?” [Very likely to succeed = 3, Somewhat likely to succeed = 2, Not very likely to succeed = 1, Not at all likely to succeed = 0].
Vote: Respondents were asked “If the general election for President were held today and the candidates were: George W. Bush, the Republican, John Kerry, the Democrat, Ralph Nader, the Independent for whom would you vote?” If undecided, respondents were asked “Toward whom do you lean?” [Bush = 4, Lean Bush = 3, Undecided = 2, Lean Kerry = 1, Kerry = 0].
Casualty Tolerance: To measure casualty tolerance, we asked respondents a series of questions, including a split sample design to assess if the number of dead and wounded affects opinion differently than just the number dead. We found no difference by including information about the number wounded in addition to those killed. In the questions that follow, the extra wording for the split sample is included in parentheses.
All respondents received the statement, “Regardless of whether you think the President made the right decision in attacking Iraq, as you know the United States is engaged in an ongoing military operation there and has suffered about 1,000 military deaths (and over 7,000 military wounded).”
Respondents were then asked, “Would you support continued U.S. military action in Iraq until a new Iraqi government can take over if it resulted in no additional U.S. military deaths?” [If they said no Casualty Tolerance = 0, if they said yes they were asked] “would you support continued U.S. military action in Iraq until a new Iraqi government can take over if it resulted in up to 1,500 total U.S. military deaths (and over 10,000 military wounded)?” [If they said no Casualty Tolerance = 1, if they said yes they were asked] “Would you support continued U.S. military action in Iraq until a new Iraqi government can take over if it resulted in up to 5,000 total U.S. military deaths (and over 30,000 military wounded)?” [If they said no Casualty Tolerance = 2, if they said yes they were asked] “Would you support continued U.S. military action in Iraq until a new Iraqi government can take over if it resulted in up to 50,000 total U.S. military deaths (and over 300,000 military wounded)?” [If they said no Casualty Tolerance = 3, if they said yes Casualty Tolerance = 4].
Age: Seven category variable [18–24 = 0, 25–34 = 1, 35–44 = 2, 45–54 = 3, 55–64 = 4, 65–74 = 5, 75+ = 6].
Education: Four category variable [High school or less = 0, High school diploma = 1, Some college = 2, Bachelors degree or higher = 3].
Female: Dummy variable [Male = 0, Female = 1].
Minority: Dummy variable [White Non-Hispanic = 0; Black, Hispanic or other = 1].
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Gelpi, C., Reifler, J. & Feaver, P. Iraq the Vote: Retrospective and Prospective Foreign Policy Judgments on Candidate Choice and Casualty Tolerance. Polit Behav 29, 151–174 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-007-9029-6
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-007-9029-6