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Current and voltage based bit errors and their combined mitigation for the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise secure key exchange

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Abstract

We classify and analyze bit errors in the current measurement mode of the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) key distribution. The error probability decays exponentially with increasing bit exchange period and fixed bandwidth, which is similar to the error probability decay in the voltage measurement mode. We also analyze the combination of voltage and current modes for error removal. In this combination method, the error probability is still an exponential function that decays with the duration of the bit exchange period, but it has superior fidelity to the former schemes.

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Acknowledgements

Discussions with Elias Gonzalez are appreciated. Y. Saez is grateful to IFARHU/SENACYT for supporting her PhD studies at Texas A&M. R. Mingesz’s contribution is supported by the European Union and the European Social Fund. Project #TÁMOP-4.2.2.A-11/1/KONV-2012-0073.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, 77843-3128, USA

    Yessica Saez & Laszlo B. Kish

  2. Department of Technical Informatics, University of Szeged, Árpád tér 2, Szeged, 6701, Hungary

    Robert Mingesz & Zoltan Gingl

  3. Department of Engineering Sciences, The Ångström Laboratory, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 534, 75121, Uppsala, Sweden

    Claes G. Granqvist

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  1. Yessica Saez
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  2. Laszlo B. Kish
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  3. Robert Mingesz
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  5. Claes G. Granqvist
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Correspondence to Yessica Saez.

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Saez, Y., Kish, L.B., Mingesz, R. et al. Current and voltage based bit errors and their combined mitigation for the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise secure key exchange. J Comput Electron 13, 271–277 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10825-013-0515-2

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