Summary
We unite two general models for evolutionary change under the forces of selection, mutation and reproduction, a genetic model (replicator dynamics) and a cultural model (gradient dynamics). Under the assumption of normality, we find that the mean and variance dynamics are essentially identical under the two models and we relate these to the ESS and convergence stability conditions.
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Taylor, P., Day, T. Evolutionary stability under the replicator and the gradient dynamics. Evol Ecol 11, 579–590 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10682-997-1513-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10682-997-1513-2