Abstract
Existence of a “simple” pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium is established in a model of endogenous agenda formation and sophisticated voting; upper hemicontinuity of simple equilibrium outcomes is demonstrated; and connections to the set of undominated, or “core,” alternatives are examined. In one dimension with single-peaked preferences, the simple equilibrium outcome is essentially unique and lies in the core, providing a game-theoretic foundation for the median voter theorem in terms of endogenous agenda setting. Existence of equilibrium relies on a general characterization of sophisticated voting outcomes in the presence of “majority-ties,” rather than the standard tie-breaking convention in voting subgames in favor of the alternative proposed later. The model is illustrated in a three-agent distributive politics setting, and it is shown there that the standard tie-breaking convention leads to non-existence of equilibrium.
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Duggan, J. Endogenous Voting Agendas. Soc Choice Welfare 27, 495–530 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0143-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0143-x