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Wittgenstein and ant-watching

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Abstract

Research in animal behavior begins by identifying what animals are doing. In the course of observation, the observer comes to see animals as performing a particular activity. How does this process work? How cn we be certain that behavior is identified correctly? Wittgenstein offers an approach to these questions. looking at the uses of certainly rather than attempting to find rules that guarantee it. Here two stages in research are distinguished: first, watching animals, and second, reporting the results to other scientists. Certainly about what animals are doing, has different uses at each stage.

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Gordon, D.M. Wittgenstein and ant-watching. Biol Philos 7, 13–25 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00130161

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