Abstract
We survey results related to the problem of the existence of equilibria in some classes of infinitely repeated two-person games of incomplete information on one side, first considered by Aumann, Maschler and Stearns. We generalize this setting to a broader one of principal-agent problems. We also discuss topological results needed, presenting them dually (using cohomology in place of homology) and more systematically than in our earlier papers.
Resumen
Exponemos resultados relacionados con el problema de la existencia de equilibrios en algunas clases de juegos bipersonales infinitamente repetidos con información incompleta por una de las partes, considerados por primera vez por Aumann, Maschler y Stearns. Generalizamos este marco a uno más amplio de problemas de agentes principales. También discutimos los resultados topológicos necesarios, presentándolos dualmente (usando cohomología en lugar de homología) y de modo más sistemático que en nuestros artículos anteriores.
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Simon, R.S., Spież, S. & Toruńczyk, H. Equilibria in a class of games and topological results implying their existence. Rev. R. Acad. Cien. Serie A. Mat. 102, 161–179 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03191816
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03191816
Keywords
- repeated games of incomplete information
- principal-agent theory
- sender-receiver games
- incentive compatibility (Game Theory)
- essential mappings
- coincidences
- set-valued functions
- cohomology (Topology)