Abstract
We review some properties of the evolutionary dynamics for asymmetric conflicts, give a simplified approach to them, and present some new results on the stability and bifurcations occurring in these conservative systems. In particular, we compare their dynamics to those of Hamiltonian systems
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Hofbauer, J. Evolutionary dynamics for bimatrix games: A Hamiltonian system?. J. Math. Biology 34, 675–688 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02409754
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02409754