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Designing incentive regulation

  • Papers On Regulatory Design And Policies
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Abstract

This paper presents a nontechnical investigation of the properties of sound, effective incentive regulation. The characteristics of good incentive regulation plans are linked to the goals, powers, and abilities of regulators, and to the nature of the regulatory environment. The paper concludes with ten simple guidelines that may prove useful to policymakers charged with the difficult task of designing an incentive regulation plan.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Florida, 32611, Gainesville, Florida, USA

    David E. M. Sappington

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  1. David E. M. Sappington
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Additional information

The helpful comments provided by Sanford Berg, Albert Danielsen, Tracy Lewis, Ashoka Mody, Mark Reeder, and Dennis Weisman are gratefully acknowledged.

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Sappington, D.E.M. Designing incentive regulation. Rev Ind Organ 9, 245–272 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01025724

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