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Self-refuting theories of strategic interaction: A paradox of common knowledge

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The University of Chicago, Center for Ethics, Rationality and Society, 5828 South University Avenue, 60637, Chicago, IL, USA

    Cristina Bicchieri

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, 46556, Notre Dame, IN, USA

    Cristina Bicchieri

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  1. Cristina Bicchieri
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Additional information

I am grateful to Tommy Tan and Philip Reny for helping me appreciate the importance of common knowledge in games, and to Jon Elster and Michael Woodford for many useful comments. Financial support from National Science Foundation Grant SES 87-10209 is gratefully acknowledged.

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Bicchieri, C. Self-refuting theories of strategic interaction: A paradox of common knowledge. Erkenntnis 30, 69–85 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00184816

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