Skip to main content
Log in

A spatial model with party activists: implications for electoral dynamics

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Aldrich, J.H. (1982a) A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activists, paper delivered at the 1981 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Cincinnati, Ohio.

  • (1982b) The Importance of Public Goods and Public Policy Motivations for the Logic of Collective Action When There are Competing Groups, Unpublished Paper, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota.

  • Aranson, P.H. and Ordeshook, P.C. (1972) Spatial Strategies for Sequential Elections, Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, eds., Probability Models of Collective Decision Making. Charles E. Merrill: Columbus, Ohio.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis, O.A., Hinich, M.J. and Ordeshook, P.C. (1970) An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process, American Political Science Review, 64: 426–449.

    Google Scholar 

  • Enelow, J. and Hinich, M.J. (1980) A New Approach to Voter Uncertainty in the Downsian Spatial Model, Unpublished Paper, Virginia Polytechnic Institute.

  • Hinich, M.J. and Ordeshook, P.C. (1969) Abstentions and Equilibrium in the Electoral Process, Public Choice, 7: 81–106.

    Google Scholar 

  • and and Pollard, W. (1981) A New Approach to the Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition, American Journal of Political Science, 25: 323–341.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, W. (1973) Advanced Calculus, Second edition. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.

    Google Scholar 

  • Key, V.O., Jr. (1955) A Theory of Critical Elections, Journal of Politics, 17: 3–18.

    Google Scholar 

  • (1959) Secular Realignment and the Party System, Journal of Politics, 21: 198–210.

    Google Scholar 

  • McKelvey, R.D. (1975) Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium, Econometrica, 43: 815–843.

    Google Scholar 

  • (1979) General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models, Econometrica, 47: 1085–1111.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moe, T.M. (1980a) The Organization of Interests. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • (1980b) A Calculus of Group Membership, American Journal of Political Science, 24: 593–632.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson, M. (1971) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. New York: Schocken.

    Google Scholar 

  • Page, B.I. (1978) Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections: Rational Man and Electoral Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Riker, W.H. (1980) Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. American Political Science Review, 74: 432–446.

    Google Scholar 

  • and Ordeshook, P.C. (1973) An Introduction to Positive Political Theory, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schofield, N. (1978) Instability of Simple Dynamic Games, Review of Economic Studies, 45: 575–594.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sundquist, J.L. (1973) Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States. Washington: The Brookings Institution.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

Research reported in this paper was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation, SES-8105848. I would like to thank Michael McGinnis for his help. I would like to express my appreciation to Professor Mel Hinich who commented on my paper and to the others at the Conference who also gave many useful suggestions. I alone remain responsible for the contents.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Aldrich, J.H. A spatial model with party activists: implications for electoral dynamics. Public Choice 41, 63–100 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124050

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124050

Keywords

Navigation