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Defending Underdetermination or Why the Historical Perspective Makes a Difference

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EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009

Part of the book series: The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings ((EPSP,volume 1))

Abstract

It is revealing to compare W.V.O. Quine’s ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’, the locus classicus for his underdetermination thesis, with the relevant passages about underdetermination in Pierre Duhem’s ‘The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory’. While Duhem’s book is filled with examples from the history of physics, in Quine’s text historical references are almost completely lacking. While Duhem, the acclaimed historian of physics, was practising philosophy of science from a genuinely historical perspective, Quine approached underdetermination from an ahistorical, a logical point of view.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    An excellent overview and introduction to this objection can be found in (Norton 2008, 26–32).

  2. 2.

    Duhem does include a thorough critique of inductive methods (1906/1954, Part II ch. VI).

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Mauricio Suárez and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions as well as to audiences at EPSA09 in Amsterdam and at &HPS2 in Notre Dame.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Carl von Linde-Akademie, Technische Universität München, Munich, Germany

    Wolfgang Pietsch

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  1. Wolfgang Pietsch
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Correspondence to Wolfgang Pietsch .

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  1. De Boelelaan 1105, HV Amsterdam, 1081, Netherlands

    Henk W. de Regt

  2. PO Box 90153, Tilburg, 5000 LE, Netherlands

    Stephan Hartmann

  3. Bristol, BS8 1TB, United Kingdom

    Samir Okasha

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Pietsch, W. (2012). Defending Underdetermination or Why the Historical Perspective Makes a Difference. In: de Regt, H., Hartmann, S., Okasha, S. (eds) EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4_26

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