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Can Bandwidth Sharing Be Truthful?

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 9347))

Abstract

Peer to peer (P2P) and Crowd Sourcing systems have built their success on resource sharing protocols such as BitTorrent and Open Garden. While previous studies addressed the issue of fairness, we discuss prevention of manipulative actions a player may lie to take the advantage of the protocols. We prove that, under a proportional response protocol, a player deviating from the protocol by reporting false broken links will not make any gain in its utility eventually. This result establishes the strategic stability of a popular resource sharing P2P system in the Internet.

This research was partially supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China (No. 11301475, 61173011).

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Correspondence to Xiang Yan .

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Cheng, Y., Deng, X., Pi, Y., Yan, X. (2015). Can Bandwidth Sharing Be Truthful?. In: Hoefer, M. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9347. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_15

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-48432-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-48433-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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