Abstract
The present article focuses on the effect that conditional contributions can have on the provision of public goods. First, a theoretical analysis is presented. It is argued that since promises will often be conditional, making promises can be regarded as a strategic move that alters the payoff structure of public good dilemmas. Second, an experiment is reported in which one member supposedly committed him/herself to contribute if at least one other member contributed too. The main focus in the experiment was on the reactions of the members confronted with this conditional contribution.
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© 1984 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg
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van Dijk, E., Wilke, H. (1984). Conditional contributions and public good provision. In: Schulz, U., Albers, W., Mueller, U. (eds) Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78860-4_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78860-4_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-78862-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-78860-4
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