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The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: A Successful Example of Networked Governance?

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Networked Governance, Transnational Business and the Law

Abstract

The contribution of Mathias Siems and Oscar Alvarez-Macotela, The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: A Successful Example of Networked Governance?, discusses whether the approach of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, predominantly aimed at the law-makers and firms of emerging markets, can be regarded as a success. While features of networked governance are clearly visible in the drafting and operation of the Principles, the practical effectiveness may be hindered by the lack of well-functioning local institutions. Moreover, while appreciating that the OECD has engaged in activities such as regional roundtables in order to take account of the local context, the Principles themselves are based on the corporate governance model of the OECD member countries not perfectly suitable for emerging markets. Recent events also point towards scepticism of whether adoption of the Principles can be seen as an effective way to prevent future financial crises.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    OECD (2013).

  2. 2.

    For references and details see Sect. 2 Setting the Scene: The OECD Principles and ‘Networked Governance’ below. In addition, the OECD has developed Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State Owned Enterprises and Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, not discussed in this chapter.

  3. 3.

    For a good overview see Nielsen (2011).

  4. 4.

    See Roughneen (2011). South Africa is sometimes added to the former group, thus, this group becomes BRICS, see http://www.brics5.co.za/. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  5. 5.

    See e.g. Avilov et al. (1999); Pistor et al. (2000); Fox and Heller (2006).

  6. 6.

    See OECD (2004).

  7. 7.

    See Bouchez (2007), pp. 109–110; Fazio (2008), p. 107.

  8. 8.

    Baker (2012).

  9. 9.

    Martens and Jakobi (2010), p. 14.

  10. 10.

    Porter and Webb (2008). Note that the ICGN has also developed its own Global Corporate Governance Principles, ICGN (2009).

  11. 11.

    The aspiration to reduce transaction costs is a frequent topic in the literature on harmonisation: see, e.g., Mattei (1997), pp. 94, 219.

  12. 12.

    OECD Principles (2004), VI.E1.

  13. 13.

    OECD Principles (2004), IV, VI.C.

  14. 14.

    See also Baker (2012), p. 397 (on compromise nature of Principles); Kaufman and Englander (2006); Ceroni (2008).

  15. 15.

    See the Annotation to OECD Principles (2004), III.A.1.

  16. 16.

    Cf. WFE (2009), p. 33 (WFE support of OECD Principles). See also Christiansen and Koldertsova (2009).

  17. 17.

    See Sect. 3 The Impact of the OECD Principles on State Legislation below.

  18. 18.

    Though it is doubtful whether such a positive relationship between adopting international benchmarks and foreign investment actually exists. See Perry-Kessaris (2003).

  19. 19.

    See also Center for International Private Enterprise (2011): ‘In emerging markets all over the world, corporate governance can give companies a competitive edge’.

  20. 20.

    Sherman (2004).

  21. 21.

    Guobadia (2001); Abu-Tapanjeh (2009); Sharar (2010); Al-Saeed (2012).

  22. 22.

    Tsipouri and Xanthakis (2004); Jesover (2001); Iu and Batten (2001); Chen et al. (2011); Khan (2012).

  23. 23.

    See notes 55, 62 and 63.

  24. 24.

    Slaughter (2004), p. 46.

  25. 25.

    Ougaard (2010), p. 45.

  26. 26.

    Mahon and McBride (2008), p. 21; McBride and Mahon (2008), p. 278.

  27. 27.

    Porter and Webb (2008), p. 44.

  28. 28.

    OECD (1995), p. 73.

  29. 29.

    European Commission (2001), pp. 6–8. See also Schout and Jordan (2008).

  30. 30.

    Jordan and Schout (2007), p. 56.

  31. 31.

    Jordan and Schout (2007), pp. 15–16. For an overview of the emerging literature on policy networks see also Börzel (1998).

  32. 32.

    Börzel (1998), pp. 262–263; Jordan and Schout (2007), p. 17.

  33. 33.

    This is despite some ambiguity in the scholarly definition which has been acknowledged in dedicated reviews of literature on that topic, e.g., Börzel (1998), pp. 254–255.

  34. 34.

    Coen and Thatcher (2008), pp. 50 and 67.

  35. 35.

    See also Sect. 5 The Substantive Fit of the OECD Principles and Sect. 6 Recent Developments below.

  36. 36.

    References in Siems (2008a), p. 227.

  37. 37.

    See also the subsequent discussion of the situation in Mexico, Sect. 4, below.

  38. 38.

    Carroll and Kellow (2011), p. 259 (noting that Mexican membership aimed to ensure regional balance as some Eastern European countries also joined). For the list of OECD members see http://www.oecd.org/general/listofoecdmembercountries-ratificationoftheconventionontheoecd.htm. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  39. 39.

    Brazil already participates in some of the OECD bodies. See Schewel (2010); Ougaard (2010), pp. 41–42.

  40. 40.

    PRLog.Org (2009) (quoting the former Brazilian Finance Minister Rubens Ricupero).

  41. 41.

    See http://www.oecd.org/general/oecdenlargement.htm. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  42. 42.

    Carroll and Kellow (2011), p. 164.

  43. 43.

    See http://www.oecd.org/russia/therussianfederationandtheoecd.htm and http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs/russia. Both accessed 30 July 2013.

  44. 44.

    See http://webnet.oecd.org/oecdacts/ (search for ‘recommendations’) and http://www.oecd.org/legal/oecdlegalinstruments-theacts.htm. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  45. 45.

    See http://www.oecd.org/site/peerreview/. Accessed 30 July 2013 and, e.g., Martens and Jakobi (2010), pp. 10–11; Porter and Webb (2008), pp. 49–52.

  46. 46.

    OECD (2011a, b); OECD (2012a, b). A similar selective report is IOSCO (2007a) (in consultation with the OECD).

  47. 47.

    See http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/index.htm. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  48. 48.

    See http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/activities/peer_reviews.htm; http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/activities/peer_reviews.htm. Both accessed 30 July 2013.

  49. 49.

    See http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fssa.aspx. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  50. 50.

    See http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg.html; also http://www.imf.org/external/NP/rosc/rosc.aspx. Accessed 30 July 2013. In 2007 the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) conducted a similar assessment for the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia: EBRD (2007).

  51. 51.

    See http://www.gcgf.org/. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  52. 52.

    See Khan (2012), p. 225.

  53. 53.

    See OECD (2007), pp. 9–14.

  54. 54.

    They are available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg.html. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  55. 55.

    For Mexico see Alvarez-Macotela (2008), p. 125. For Brazil see Fazio (2008), p. 111.

  56. 56.

    See Sect. 4 The Operation of the OECD Principles at the ‘Micro Level’ below.

  57. 57.

    See Gilson et al. (2011).

  58. 58.

    See Siems (2008b), pp. 122–123.

  59. 59.

    See e.g. World Bank (2010), p. 33 referring to World Bank (2008).

  60. 60.

    See e.g. the special issues of the American Journal of Comparative Law vol. 57 (2009), issue 4, the University of Toronto Law Journal vol. 59 (2009), issue 2, and the BYU Law Review vol. 2009, issue 6.

  61. 61.

    See http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/latinamericanroundtableoncorporategovernance.htm. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  62. 62.

    Kitagawa and Ribeiro (2009).

  63. 63.

    OECD (2003).

  64. 64.

    OECD (2011c).

  65. 65.

    Jesover and Kirkpatrick (2005), pp. 128–129 (note that both authors work for the OECD). The role of enforcement has also been stressed following the financial crisis of 2008. See OECD (2010), para. 14, and Sect. 6 Recent Developments below.

  66. 66.

    Baker (2012). But also see de Búrca et al. (2013) (suggesting a mode of ‘experimentalist governance’ which goes beyond ‘orchestrated networks’).

  67. 67.

    See http://www.oecd.org/brazil/corporategovernanceinlatinamerica.htm. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  68. 68.

    According to Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2007), p. 433: ‘Mexico was concerned about corporate governance mainly as a result of the lack of growth in domestic markets and the damaging experience in East Asia, where economies were emerging from the 1997–1998 crisis…’.

  69. 69.

    http://www.cce.org.mx/CMPC/. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  70. 70.

    See CEGC (2013a, b).

  71. 71.

    CEGC (2011) and OECD (2011c), p. 4.

  72. 72.

    Brokerage firms via the AMIB and the Mexican Stock Exchange (MSE); banks via the AMB; listed firms via the CCE and the Mexican Association of Investor Relations (AMERI); investors via the Mexican Association of Independent Investment Advisers (AMAII) and, indirectly, via collective investments such as pension and mutual funds, and the financial authority via organisations such as the IOSCO.

  73. 73.

    Some of the wealthiest families are simultaneously investors, controlling shareholders of listed firms and financial intermediaries. Financial firms also invest in the market, and non-financial firms engage in an informal system of finance providing capital and credit. Alvarez-Macotela (2008), pp. 141 (note 70), 245 and 348.

  74. 74.

    Alvarez-Macotela (2008), p. 298.

  75. 75.

    Limited liability corporation aimed at promoting domestic and foreign investment by providing some protections not established under ordinary company law in Mexico, e.g. not subject to the supervision of the financial authority; minority shareholders have additional protection such as the right to appoint a director and an examiner, the right to call a meeting having 10 % of the equity’s firm, puts, calls, tag-along, drag-along, etc.

  76. 76.

    Limited liability corporation, similar to SAPIs but they are expected to become publicly traded in less than 3 years i.e. a transition vehicle to become a SAB.

  77. 77.

    Limited liability corporation publicly traded, i.e. firms that issue shares listed on the MSE.

  78. 78.

    Podolsky (2006), p. 3. Note: exclamation marks are original from the OECD’s paper.

  79. 79.

    Podolsky (2006), p. 5.

  80. 80.

    Kersbergen and Waarden (2004), p. 147.

  81. 81.

    OECD (2011c), p. 31.

  82. 82.

    Deloitte (2012), p. 42.

  83. 83.

    GCGF (2013). See also infra note 85.

  84. 84.

    Kar (2011), p. 6.

  85. 85.

    Kogut (2012); Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013); Iu and Batten (2001), p. 60.

  86. 86.

    Alvarez-Macotela (2008), p. 2.

  87. 87.

    See generally Morck and Steier (2005), p. 6: ‘Anglo-American shareholder capitalism is exceptional. Other systems predominate (…) the most common system of corporate governance in the world is family capitalism’.

  88. 88.

    Bertrand and Schoar (2006), p. 94.

  89. 89.

    North (1993), p. 19.

  90. 90.

    Aguilera et al. (2012), pp. 321, 332 and 339.

  91. 91.

    Alvarez-Macotela (2012), p. 510; Black (2001).

  92. 92.

    See Sect. 3 The Impact of the OECD Principles on State Legislation above. See also IOSCO (2007b).

  93. 93.

    For a helpful contribution comparing Islamic and OECD Principles, see Abu-Tapanjeh (2009), pp. 564 and 565.

  94. 94.

    See Chen et al. (2011), pp. 132 and 134, and more generally Caron et al. (2012).

  95. 95.

    For the case of Mexico see Alvarez-Macotela (2008), pp. 147–152. For the case of China see Wang (2001), pp. 169–170.

  96. 96.

    Alvarez-Macotela (2008), p. 154.

  97. 97.

    See Sect. 2 Setting the Scene: The OECD Principles and ‘Networked Governance’ above, and Kersbergen and Waarden (2004), p. 153.

  98. 98.

    Chen et al. (2011), p. 132: ‘We find that in China, none of the ‘good’ practices prescribed by the OECD… is effective in attenuating the negative consequences of controlling-shareholder expropriation on corporate performance’.

  99. 99.

    Kar (2011). See also Sect. 3 The Impact of the OECD Principles on State Legislation above.

  100. 100.

    Traditionally, bankers in Mexico developed the informal institution of lending primarily to themselves and their family members. Credit was restricted to those few entrepreneurs who happened to have family connections with the few people controlling banks. See Haber (2008), pp.39 and 46.

  101. 101.

    Husted and Serrano (2002), p. 337.

  102. 102.

    See OECD (2006), pp. 53–54 (details on how the Turkish authorities ‘are committed to pursue reforms’).

  103. 103.

    This term is inspired by the Common Frame of Reference proposed for a European Contract Law. See http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/contract_law_en.htm. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  104. 104.

    See e.g. Mukwiri and Siems (2014).

  105. 105.

    OECD (2009a). Similar OECD (2010). The previous report was OECD (2009b). See also http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/corporategovernanceandthefinancialcrisis.htm. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  106. 106.

    See Sect. 3 The Impact of the OECD Principles on State Legislation above.

  107. 107.

    For more details see e.g. Cheffins (2009); Konzelmann and Fovargue-Davies (2012).

  108. 108.

    For good overviews see Xu (2011); Aguilera and Jackson (2010); Brown et al. (2011); Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013).

  109. 109.

    See Mahon and McBride (2008), p. 14; McBride and Mahon (2008), p. 279. For the ongoing attempts of the OECD to liberalise investment see Williams (2008).

  110. 110.

    For such a view see Soederberg (2003). See also Sect. 2 Setting the Scene: The OECD Principles and ‘Networked Governance’ above.

  111. 111.

    See Sect. 2 Setting the Scene: The OECD Principles and ‘Networked Governance’ above.

  112. 112.

    Ostrom (1990); Keohane and Ostrom (1995), pp. 22–23. See also Jordan and Schout (2007), p. 37; Alvarez-Macotela (2008), pp. 51–52.

  113. 113.

    Cf. e.g. Rittel and Webber (1973); Meuleman (2013), p. 42 (wicked problems as escaping logics of hierarchies and markets).

  114. 114.

    See Sect. 5 The Substantive Fit of the OECD Principles above.

  115. 115.

    See Morck and Steier (2005), p. 58: ‘Many countries now considered to have highly trustworthy institutions, including institutions of corporate governance, were profoundly corrupt only a few generations ago. There seems to have been an evolution toward ever less popular tolerance of corrupt elites everywhere, except perhaps in Britain’.

  116. 116.

    See Sect. 3 The Impact of the OECD Principles on State Legislation above.

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Acknowledgements

We thank the participants of the eighth Annual Kyushu University Law Conference and the research seminar series of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (IALS) at the University of London for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Durham Law School, Durham University, Stockton Road, Durham, DH1 3LE, UK

    Mathias M. Siems

  2. Centre for Research on Consumption and the Consumer (CICC), Mexico City, Mexico

    Oscar Alvarez-Macotela

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  1. Mathias M. Siems
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Correspondence to Mathias M. Siems .

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  1. Graduate School of Law, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

    Mark Fenwick

  2. Graduate School of Law, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

    Steven Van Uytsel

  3. Graduate School of Law, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

    Stefan Wrbka

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Siems, M.M., Alvarez-Macotela, O. (2014). The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: A Successful Example of Networked Governance?. In: Fenwick, M., Van Uytsel, S., Wrbka, S. (eds) Networked Governance, Transnational Business and the Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41212-7_12

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