Abstract
Leakage-resilient cryptographic protocols have recently been evolving intensively, studying the question of designing protocol that maintain security even in the presence of side-channel attacks. Under leakage assumption(the verifier uses side-channel attacks to obtain some information about the secret state of the prover), the known zero knowledge protocol may not preserve zero knowledge any more. Garg et.al. first studied leakage-resilient zero knowledge and presented an excellent construction for NP. Unfortunately, the definition is not suitable for honest verifier leakage-resilient zero knowledge. In this paper, we give a new definition of leakage-resilient zero knowledge and construct a leakage-resilient zero knowledge proof for approximate version of the closest vector problem(\(\textsc{G}_{\textsc{AP}}\textsc{CVP}_\gamma\)). We also give a definition of leakage-resilient bit commitment scheme.
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.60970139, the Strategic Priority Research Program of Chinese Academy of Sciences under Grant XDA06010702, and IIEs Cryptography Research Project.
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Liu, Y., Li, H., Niu, Q. (2012). A Leakage-Resilient Zero Knowledge Proof for Lattice Problem. In: Xiang, Y., Lopez, J., Kuo, CC.J., Zhou, W. (eds) Cyberspace Safety and Security. CSS 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7672. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35362-8_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35362-8_21
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