Abstract
This paper presents an extension of the Prêt à Voter verifiable voting system to handle write-ins. This is achieved by introducing an additional ‘Write-In’ option and allowing the voter optionally to enter a write-in candidate of their choice. The voter obtains a receipt which includes their write-in, but that receipt does not indicate whether the write-in candidate was selected or not. The system provides flexibility with respect to the tallying of write-in votes. We also introduce null ballots in order to achieve receipt-freeness with respect to write-ins.
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Schneider, S., Srinivasan, S., Culnane, C., Heather, J., Xia, Z. (2012). Prêt á Voter with Write-Ins. In: Kiayias, A., Lipmaa, H. (eds) E-Voting and Identity. Vote-ID 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7187. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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