Abstract
Camellia, which is a block cipher selected as a standard by ISO/IEC, is one of the most widely used block ciphers. In this paper, we propose several 6-round impossible differentials of Camellia with FL/FL − 1 layers in the middle of them. With the impossible differentials and a well-organized precomputed table, impossible differential attacks on 10-round Camellia-192 and 11-round Camellia-256 are given, and the time complexities are 2175.3 and 2206.8 respectively. In addition, an impossible differential attack on 15-round Camellia-256 without FL/FL − 1 layers and whitening is also be given, which needs about 2236.1 encryptions. To the best of our knowledge, these are the best cryptanalytic results of Camellia-192/-256 with FL/FL − 1 layers and Camellia-256 without FL/FL − 1 layers to date.
Supported by 973 Project (No.2007CB807902), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No.60931160442) and Graduate Independent Innovation Foundation of Shandong University (No. 11140070613183).
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Chen, J., Jia, K., Yu, H., Wang, X. (2011). New Impossible Differential Attacks of Reduced-Round Camellia-192 and Camellia-256. In: Parampalli, U., Hawkes, P. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6812. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22497-3_2
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