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Settings of Consensual Processes: Candidates, Verdicts, Policies

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Consensual Processes

Part of the book series: Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing ((STUDFUZZ,volume 267))

Abstract

Social choice theory deals with mutual compatibilities of various choice criteria or desiderata. It thus provides a natural angle to look at methods for finding consensus. We distinguish between three types of settings of consensus-reaching. Firstly, we may be looking for the correct decision. This is typically the setting where the participants have different degrees of expertise on an issue to be decided. Also jury decision making falls into this category. Secondly, the setting may involve the selection of one out of a set of candidates for e.g. a public office. Thirdly, we may be looking for a policy consensus. This setting is otherwise similar to the candidate choice setting, but usually involves more freedom in constructing new alternatives. Once these settings and relevant results in each one of them have been reviewed, we discuss the implications of some choice paradoxes to consensus-reaching methods.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Public Choice Research Centre and Department of Political Science and Contemporary History, University of Turku, FI-20014, TURKU, Finland

    Hannu Nurmi

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  1. Hannu Nurmi
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Depto. Ciencias de la Computación e Inteligencia Artificial, Universidad Granada, C/ Periodista Daniel Saucedo Aranda s/n, 18071, Granada, Spain

    Enrique Herrera-Viedma

  2. Departamento de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Valladolid, Avenida Valle Esgueva 6, 47011, Valladolid, Spain

    José Luis García-Lapresta

  3. Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Newelska 6, 01–447, Warsaw, Poland

    Janusz Kacprzyk

  4. Fac. Economia Dipto. Informatica e Studi Aziendali, Università di Trento, Via Inama 5, 38100, Trento, Trento, Italy

    Mario Fedrizzi

  5. Department of Political Science and Contemporary History, University of Turku, Turku, Finland

    Hannu Nurmi

  6. Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Newelska 6, 01-447, Warsaw, Poland

    Sławomir Zadrożny

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Nurmi, H. (2011). Settings of Consensual Processes: Candidates, Verdicts, Policies. In: Herrera-Viedma, E., García-Lapresta, J.L., Kacprzyk, J., Fedrizzi, M., Nurmi, H., Zadrożny, S. (eds) Consensual Processes. Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, vol 267. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20533-0_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20533-0_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-20532-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-20533-0

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