Abstract
There has been extensive research focusing on improving CBC-MAC to operate on variable length messages with less keys and less blockcipher invocations. After Black and Rogaway’s XCBC, Moriai and Imai proposed 2-Key XCBC, which replaced the third key of XCBC with its first key. Moriai and Imai “proved” that 2-Key XCBC is secure if the underling blockcipher is a pseudorandom permutation (PRP). Our research shows that it is not the case. The security of 2-Key XCBC can not be proved under the solo assumption of PRP, even if it is a RPR-RK secure against some related-key attack. We construct a special PRP (PRP-RK) to show that the main lemma in [14] is not true and 2-Key XCBC using this PRP (PRP-RK) is totally insecure.
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Wang, P., Feng, D., Wu, W., Zhang, L. (2008). On the Unprovable Security of 2-Key XCBC. In: Mu, Y., Susilo, W., Seberry, J. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5107. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70500-0_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70500-0_17
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