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International Conference on Intelligent Decision Technologies

IDT 2017: Intelligent Decision Technologies 2017 pp 82–91Cite as

Manipulability of Majority Relation-Based Collective Decision Rules

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Part of the book series: Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies ((SIST,volume 72))

Abstract

In the problem of aggregation of rankings or preferences of several agents, there is a well-known result that reasonable social ranking is not strategy-proof. In other words, there are some situations when at least one agent can submit insincere ranking and change the final result in a way beneficial to him. We call this situation manipulable and using computer modelling we study 10 majority relation-based collective decision rules and compare them by their degree of manipulability, i.e. by the share of the situation in which manipulation is possible. We found that there is no rule that is best for all possible cases but some rules like Fishburn rule, Minimal undominated set and Uncovered set II are among the least manipulable ones.

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Acknowledgments

The article was prepared within the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) and supported within the framework of a subsidy by the Russian Academic Excellence Project ‘5-100’. We thank Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis (DeCAn) at the HSE for support.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

    Fuad Aleskerov, Alexander Ivanov, Daniel Karabekyan & Vyacheslav Yakuba

  2. Institute of Control Sciences of Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

    Fuad Aleskerov & Vyacheslav Yakuba

  3. Skoltech, Moscow, Russia

    Alexander Ivanov

Authors
  1. Fuad Aleskerov
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  2. Alexander Ivanov
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  3. Daniel Karabekyan
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  4. Vyacheslav Yakuba
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Daniel Karabekyan .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Maritime University , Gdynia, Poland

    Ireneusz Czarnowski

  2. Bournemouth University and KES International, Poole, Dorset, United Kingdom

    Robert J. Howlett

  3. University of Canberra, Canberra, Aust Capital Terr, Australia

    Lakhmi C. Jain

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Aleskerov, F., Ivanov, A., Karabekyan, D., Yakuba, V. (2018). Manipulability of Majority Relation-Based Collective Decision Rules. In: Czarnowski, I., Howlett, R., Jain, L. (eds) Intelligent Decision Technologies 2017. IDT 2017. Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies, vol 72. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59421-7_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59421-7_8

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-59420-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-59421-7

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