Abstract
In practice, phenomenology is an investigation of one’s own consciousness by means of introspective awareness. Nonetheless, it can be considered a special sort of science, given that it obtains its data using a rigorous methodology. On the basis of these data, phenomenologists can devise “models” that describe the structures of consciousness. Husserl in fact thought that even the forms of logical judgments can be traced to more basic structures of consciousness. After examining the way that he locates the origin of negation in experiences of phenomenal “disappointment,” which result in part from the layered structure of time-constituting consciousness, we turn to Barry Dainton’s construction of models of the specious present. One type that is built upon Husserl’s writings is a “retentional” model where the objective present is a simple instant, but all the while other recent moments have stacked up in retentional awareness to create the illusion of a present with a durational thickness. In Dainton’s own rival “extensional” model, however, the present really does extend for a duration of about a second or so, and all the moments that seem present in fact are. At the end I propose a model of the specious present that is based on Graham Priest’s spread hypothesis. It does not vindicate dialetheism; rather, it is merely built upon the assumption that we directly perceive dialetheias of motion. It is both retentional and extensional, since in it the actual present of our conscious activity has a very tiny extensive spread, all while recent prior spreads stack up in our retentional awareness to create the impression of an enduring present. This model has the advantages of explaining the continuity of phases in the specious present while also accounting for experiences of phenomenal disappointment.
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Notes
- 1.
This specific sort of methodology is not shared by all phenomenologists, since Husserl for example was less concerned with the second and third steps. For him, phenomenology should be conducted in a mode of “understanding [Verstehen]” rather than in a mode of “explanation [Erklärung]” [7, pp. 1–14], and thus his work was not devoted to creating explanatory models. This other task is something that has been taken up more recently for example by phenomenologist Barry Dainton, whose models we discuss later and whose works inspire many of the basic questions and methodology of our treatment here. He draws from Husserl’s descriptive analyses of time consciousness and formulates models of the “specious present,” aiming to make them as faithful as possible to Husserl’s descriptions. As we noted, Husserl generated these descriptions presumably by performing his “reductions,” with another example being the epoché or “phenomenological reduction.” By means of it, we may turn our awareness away from our normal consciousness of objects, in which we regard them as being existing things, and move our attention instead toward those conscious acts through which we experience their appearing and as well toward the structures of consciousness involved in these experiences [8, pp. 51–62]. Yet, Husserl’s descriptions as we said do not go as far as presenting explanatory models, and so it is not always obvious what the best way is to formulate those models. See for example Gallagher’s [5] and Dainton’s [3] debate regarding the proper modelling of Husserl’s structures of time-consciousness.
- 2.
Dainton writes that there are no scientific studies which directly address the question of how long the specious present lasts. He does cite ones that indicate that the contents of our experience hold together in units of about three seconds long. Yet, these studies do not determine whether or not all those contents are perceived as present or if they also include memorial content. Without adequate scientific data to determine the length of the specious present, Dainton says we must use our own introspection. He reports that his specious present seems to last for a half of a second or so, but he generally uses the approximation of around one second [2, pp. 170–171].
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Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Ullrich Melle of the Husserl Archives at the University of Leuven for contributing helpful comments and advice, and as well he thanks the anonymous referees for their corrections and recommendations.
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Shores, C. (2016). Dialetheism in the Structure of Phenomenal Time. In: Andreas, H., Verdée, P. (eds) Logical Studies of Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics. Trends in Logic, vol 45. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40220-8_10
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