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RFID Authentication Protocol Resistant to the Man-in-the-Middle Attack

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International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm 2014)

Abstract

HB+ family protocols that based on LPN problem are effective and well suited for the Internet of Things. However, the HB+ family protocols have vulnerability on the man-in-the-middle attack. In this paper, we propose a new privacy preserving RFID authentication protocol based on the multiplication on \(Z_{2^k-1}\). By analyzing the differential property on \(Z_{2^{k}-1}\), we show that the protocol is resistant to the man-in-the-middle attack. Moreover, the performance analysis shows the protocol meets the demands of the large-scale RFID systems.

This work was supported by China national 863 project under No. 2013AA014002.

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Correspondence to Li Zhai .

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© 2015 Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Zhai, L., Wu, C. (2015). RFID Authentication Protocol Resistant to the Man-in-the-Middle Attack. In: Tian, J., Jing, J., Srivatsa, M. (eds) International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. SecureComm 2014. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 153. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23802-9_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23802-9_6

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-23801-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-23802-9

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