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Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective

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Abstract

In the late 2010s, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa were swept by a new revolutionary wave, which was also called “Arab Spring 2.0”. In this introductory chapter, Issaev and Korotayev offer a preliminary description and analysis of this revolutionary wave in the MENA region. The scale of the protests of the late 2010s approached the one of the Arab Spring and led to the fall of regimes in Sudan, Algeria and Mali, the protests became permanent in Lebanon and Iraq, and in Egypt and Iran they were suppressed at the cost of substantial casualties among the civilian population. As in the case of the events of the Arab Spring, the new revolutionary wave was characterized by a domino effect, when the success of the revolutionaries in one of the countries of the region gave rise to increasing protest sentiments in another. An important synchronizing factor was also dissatisfaction with rising food and fuel prices, which caused people to take to the streets in every country of the Arab Spring 2.0. At the same time, the economic agenda quickly gave way to the political one and actualized long-standing unresolved problems in each of the countries, which, as a rule, were of a systemic nature. On the other hand, the events of a new revolutionary wave were distinguished by their pronounced orientation “against everyone”, against the political class as a whole, and not just against a specific autocrat, as was mostly observed during the Arab Spring. It is no coincidence that the main slogan of the new revolutionary wave was “All Must Go” (with variations). In other words, faced with situations in which the departure of the dictator does not solve anything, or the political system does not in principle imply his existence, the dissatisfaction of the protesters was directed against the entire political establishment. The chapter ends with a description of how the present volume is organized.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note the use of the English word “song” in the Arabic text; in general, English words are occasionally found within the Arabic texts of some modern Arab revolutionary songs (e.g., UWKmedia 2012). In a version of this song (17 October Revolution 2020a, b in contrast with Hassan 2020) we find “ping pong” (al-bingh bungh) in place of “this song” (hadha-l-sungh).

  2. 2.

    See, e.g., Akaev et al. (2017), Issaev et al. (2022a), Khokhlov et al. (2021), Korotayev et al. (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019b, d, 2020, 2022, c), Ortmans et al. (2017).

  3. 3.

    Note that the recent revolutionary wave should be regarded as the fourth (rather than third) global wave of the twenty-first century revolutions if we identify as the third global revolutionary wave of this century “the Revolts against hybrid regimes (a wave of ‘Central collapse’ in Thailand, Ukraine, Bosnia, Venezuela, Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt) (in 2013–2014)” Rozov (2022: 250); see also Korotayev et al. (2015a, b).

  4. 4.

    See Chapter “Sudan's December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime” (Kostelyanets 2022, this volume) for detail.

  5. 5.

    See Chapter “The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution of Smiles has Brought Down the Sultanistic Regime in Algeria” (Zoubir 2022, this volume) for detail.

  6. 6.

    See Chapter “Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation” (Mardasov 2022, this volume) for detail.

  7. 7.

    See Chapter “Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Routs of Iran’s Domestic Instability (2010–2020)” (Kozhanov 2022, this volume) for detail.

  8. 8.

    See Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis” (Khatib 2022, this volume) for detail.

  9. 9.

    See Chapter “Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?” (Mansour and Elhefnawy 2022, this volume) for detail.

  10. 10.

    On the notion of “quasi-revolutionary episode” see Beissinger (2022).

  11. 11.

    This song describes tragic events in the soccer stadium of the Egyptian city of Port Said that took place on the 1st of February, 2012.

  12. 12.

    See Chapter “Sudan's December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime” (Kostelyanets 2022, this volume) for detail.

  13. 13.

    See Chapter “The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution of Smiles has Brought Down the Sultanistic Regime in Algeria” (Zoubir 2022, this volume) for detail.

  14. 14.

    See Chapter “The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution of Smiles has Brought Down the Sultanistic Regime in Algeria” (Zoubir 2022, this volume) for detail.

  15. 15.

    See Chapter “Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?” (Mansour and Elhefnawy 2022, this volume) for detail.

  16. 16.

    On the notion of “factional democracy/partial democracy with factionalism” and the particular vulnerability of this type of political regimes to sociopolitical destabilization see, e.g., Goldstone et al. (2010), Slinko et al. (2017), Korotayev et al. (2021b).

  17. 17.

    See Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis” (Khatib 2022, this volume) for detail.

  18. 18.

    See Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis” (Khatib 2022, this volume) for detail.

  19. 19.

    See Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis” (Khatib 2022, this volume) for detail.

  20. 20.

    See Chapter “Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation” (Mardasov 2022, this volume) for detail.

  21. 21.

    See Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis” (Khatib 2022, this volume) and Chapter “Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation” (Mardasov 2022, this volume) for detail.

  22. 22.

    Chapter “Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation” (Mardasov 2022, this volume) for detail.

  23. 23.

    Note, by the way, the use of yellow vests by the participants of the revolutionary protests in Libya in July 2022 (e.g., Elumami and al-Warfali 2022) that share many common features with the recent revolutionary events in Algeria, Lebanon, and Iraq.

  24. 24.

    In his monograph The Revolutionary City. Urbanization and the global transformation of rebellion (Beissinger 2022) whose proof Mark R. Beissinger kindly shared with after this chapter had been already finished, he offers a general definition of “coup-volution” that is quite close to ours, but not identical with it.

  25. 25.

    See Chapter “Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?” (Kashina 2022, this volume).

  26. 26.

    On Kondratieff waves in global dynamics see, e.g., (Kondratieff 1926, 1935, 1984; Schumpeter 1939; Mensch 1979; Freeman 1987; Mandel 1980; Goldstein 1988; Berry 1991; Modelski 2001; Hirooka 2006; de Groot and Frances 2008, 2012; Korotayev et al. 2011; Linstone and Devezas 2012; Grinin et al. 2016, 2017; Norkus 2016; Thompson 2016; Akaev et al. 2017; Nefiodow 2017; Gallegati et al. 2017; Modis, 2017; Coccia, 2018; Korotayev et al. 2020a).

  27. 27.

    Note that this revolution can be also interpreted as a “coupvolution”, that is, “a rather specific type of revolutionary processes, when the revolutionary mass mobilization of the first phase leads to a military coup, which can be regarded as the second phase of the revolutionary/coup-volutionary process; at the same time, during this second phase, some important demands of the first phase participants of the coup-volutionary events are realized” (see Chapter “Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021” [Korotayev and Khokhlova 2022b: 201–202, this volume]).

  28. 28.

    Note that it can well be interpreted as a “coupvolution” (see above the definitions’ section of this chapter).

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Correspondence to Leonid Issaev .

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Issaev, L., Korotayev, A. (2022). Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective. In: Issaev, L., Korotayev, A. (eds) New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region. Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_1

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