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Zero-Knowledge Proofs on Secret-Shared Data via Fully Linear PCPs

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Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2019 (CRYPTO 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11694))

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Abstract

We introduce and study the notion of fully linear probabilistically checkable proof systems. In such a proof system, the verifier can make a small number of linear queries that apply jointly to the input and a proof vector.

Our new type of proof system is motivated by applications in which the input statement is not fully available to any single verifier, but can still be efficiently accessed via linear queries. This situation arises in scenarios where the input is partitioned or secret-shared between two or more parties, or alternatively is encoded using an additively homomorphic encryption or commitment scheme. This setting appears in the context of secure messaging platforms, verifiable outsourced computation, PIR writing, private computation of aggregate statistics, and secure multiparty computation (MPC). In all these applications, there is a need for fully linear proof systems with short proofs.

While several efficient constructions of fully linear proof systems are implicit in the interactive proofs literature, many questions about their complexity are open. We present several new constructions of fully linear zero-knowledge proof systems with sublinear proof size for “simple” or “structured” languages. For example, in the non-interactive setting of fully linear PCPs, we show how to prove that an input vector \(x\in {\mathbb {F}}^n\), for a finite field \({\mathbb {F}}\), satisfies a single degree-2 equation with a proof of size \(O(\sqrt{n})\) and \(O(\sqrt{n})\) linear queries, which we show to be optimal. More generally, for languages that can be recognized by systems of constant-degree equations, we can reduce the proof size to \(O(\log n)\) at the cost of \(O(\log n)\) rounds of interaction.

We use our new proof systems to construct new short zero-knowledge proofs on distributed and secret-shared data. These proofs can be used to improve the performance of the example systems mentioned above.

Finally, we observe that zero-knowledge proofs on distributed data provide a general-purpose tool for protecting MPC protocols against malicious parties. Applying our short fully linear PCPs to “natural” MPC protocols in the honest-majority setting, we can achieve unconditional protection against malicious parties with sublinear additive communication cost. We use this to improve the communication complexity of recent honest-majority MPC protocols. For instance, using any pseudorandom generator, we obtain a 3-party protocol for Boolean circuits in which the amortized communication cost is only one bit per AND gate per party (compared to 10 bits in the best previous protocol), matching the best known protocols for semi-honest parties.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This is akin to proofs of proximity [21], which place a more stringent restriction on the verifier’s access to the input. However, unlike proofs of proximity, in fully linear PCPs the verifier is guaranteed that the input is actually in the language rather than being “close” to some input the language. Another related notion is that of a holographic proof [9, 57], where the verifier gets oracle access to an encoding of the input using an arbitrary error-correcting code.

  2. 2.

    Our compiler can analogously apply to the 3-party semi-honest protocol of Araki et al. [5]. We build on the protocol from [62] since its dealer-party structure offers a slightly simpler description within our framework and the advantage of lower online (input-dependent) cost.

  3. 3.

    For instantiating the publicly verifiable variant with bilinear groups, the linear PCP needs to have a verification predicate of algebraic degree 2. Such linear PCPs can be obtained either directly or via quadratic span programs or quadratic arithmetic programs [23, 49, 74].

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Acknowledgments

We thank Shai Halevi, Ariel Nof, Ron Rothblum, David J. Wu, and Eylon Yogev for helpful discussions and comments. Justin Thaler gave us many useful references to related work on sum-check-based proof protocols and helped us understand the relationship between those protocols and our own.

E. Boyle, N. Gilboa, and Y. Ishai supported by ERC grant 742754 (project NTSC). E. Boyle additionally supported by ISF grant 1861/16 and AFOSR Award FA9550-17-1-0069. N. Gilboa additionally supported by ISF grant 1638/15, and a grant by the BGU Cyber Center. Y. Ishai additionally supported by ISF grant 1709/14, NSF-BSF grant 2015782, and a grant from the Ministry of Science and Technology, Israel and Department of Science and Technology, Government of India. D. Boneh and H. Corrigan-Gibbs are supported by NSF, ONR, DARPA, the Simons Foundation, CISPA, and a Google faculty fellowship.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Stanford University, Stanford, USA

    Dan Boneh & Henry Corrigan-Gibbs

  2. IDC Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel

    Elette Boyle

  3. Ben-Gurion University, Be’er Sheva, Israel

    Niv Gilboa

  4. Technion, Haifa, Israel

    Yuval Ishai

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  1. Dan Boneh
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Correspondence to Dan Boneh or Elette Boyle .

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  1. Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA

    Alexandra Boldyreva

  2. University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA

    Daniele Micciancio

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Boneh, D., Boyle, E., Corrigan-Gibbs, H., Gilboa, N., Ishai, Y. (2019). Zero-Knowledge Proofs on Secret-Shared Data via Fully Linear PCPs. In: Boldyreva, A., Micciancio, D. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2019. CRYPTO 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11694. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26954-8_3

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