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Spectrum Auctions

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Wireless Network Design

Part of the book series: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science ((ISOR,volume 158))

Abstract

Most developed countries allocate radio spectrum by auction. The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (SAA) has proven to work well for this application. Recently, new designs that allow package bidding have been proposed. These designs have only been tried in the past few years. We first provide some historical background regarding the allocation of spectrum, describe the use of the SAA design and its modifications over the past 15 years, and then highlight the new advances in combinatorial auction designs and their use for the allocation of spectrum.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Systems Engineering and Operations Research Department, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, 22030, USA

    Karla Hoffman

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  1. Karla Hoffman
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Correspondence to Karla Hoffman .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Bobby B. Lyle School of Engineering, Dept. Engineering Management,, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, 75205, Texas, USA

    Jeff Kennington

  2. Bobby B. Lyle School of Engineering, Dept. Engineering Management,, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, 75205, Texas, USA

    Eli Olinick

  3. Bobby B. Lyle School of Engineering, Dept. Electrical Engineering, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, USA

    Dinesh Rajan

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Hoffman, K. (2011). Spectrum Auctions. In: Kennington, J., Olinick, E., Rajan, D. (eds) Wireless Network Design. International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, vol 158. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6111-2_7

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