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Optimal communication among team members

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 1342))

Abstract

We present a formal framework based on the theory of game with incomplete information [5] for modelling the coordination and communication problem among team of collaborative agents, and define what it means by optimal communication in this setting. Although computing an optimal communication strategy for the team is hard in general, we illustrate with an example of collaborative negotiation and meeting scheduling that computation can be substantially reduced when domain-dependent assumptions are introduced.

Supported by Overseas Postgraduate Research Scholarship and Curtin University Postgraduate Scholarship

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References

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Abdul Sattar

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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Bui, H.H., Kieronska, D., Venkatesh, S. (1997). Optimal communication among team members. In: Sattar, A. (eds) Advanced Topics in Artificial Intelligence. AI 1997. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1342. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-63797-4_64

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-63797-4_64

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-63797-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-69649-0

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