Abstract
The Clerical Basij Militia is an institution created and used by the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) to exert strict control over seminary students (tollab), silence dissident clergy, and nullify threats from seminarian scholars. The expansion of Clerical Basij in seminaries has led to regime control over clerics and the securitization of seminary schools. It has also resulted in the emergence of a new group among the clergy with a hybrid identity: part clergy, part security. The expansion and strengthening of this group could lead to the transformation of the Islamic Republic into a “theological security state.”
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Notes
Based on Reza shah order Sepahsalar seminary school located in Sepahsalar mosque in Teheran has been changed to The Faculty of Theology of Tehran University on 21 January 1931.
About 60 of Iran’s seminary schools are Safiran-ye Hedyat schools, which focus on the short-term training of clerics for propaganda missions compared to traditional schools which focus on long-term training of Shia jurists.
While, before the revolution, Ayatollah was the title for a leading and more experienced Mujtahid, after the Iranian revolution all the mujtahid have been called Ayatollah. Fischer called this process as “The rapid inflation of religious titles” in which almost every senior clergy was called Ayatollah (Fischer 2003, p 216).
While the hierarchy system of seminary education (Muqaddamati), (Sateh) and Darseh-ye Kharej) was practiced in seminary schools for decades before the revolution, the Islamic Republic has regulated these levels based on modern education systems. For example, while the Muqaddamati level could take several years, students should now finish this level in 5–6 years.
For a better understanding of how Shi’ite reasoning works, see Fischer and Abedi 1990, Chaps. 2 and 3.
The other half is known as sahm-ye Sadat, belong to poor sadat (descendants of the Prophet Mohammad through the imams line).
There is a heated discussion among the Shia ulama on the possibility that a women became a source of emulation. According to many of ulama, women can only achieve the status of a mujtahideh, in the sense of being able to follow their own independent judgment but they cannot act as marja-ye taqlid (Momen 2012). According to Fischer, one of the main argument of ulama was the inherent difference between men and women, and the incapacity of women to achieve this position. They referred to the Imam Ali’s sermon when he said “[Women] are deficient in faith, deficient in shares, and deficient in intelligence.” (2003, pp 162–163). Almost many Shia maraji believe that women cannot be a source of emulation, and have muqalled because of their “inner weakness” the issues which was rejected by a few maraji such as Grand Ayatollahs Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah in Lebanon, and Grand Ayatollah Yousef Sanei. Just recently, Sanei in an Instagram post, has declared that, in his opinion, women can become a Marja. http://www.instagram.com/p/BQsyO89DWbx/?taken-by=ayatullah.saanei&hl=en
According to Fischer in 1975, 6500 seminary students out of 10,000 studied in Qom seminary (Fischer 2003, p 77).
According to a new dissertation, defended in the social science department of Tehran University, the number of female seminarian students has incased from 32,000 in 2006 to 75,000 in 2016 (Mehrkhaneh 2016).
There is a long list of clerics, who was appointed as the head of these organizations, including Shahid Motahari School, headed by Ayatollah Imami Kashani or the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Moassesseh-ye Amuzeshi va Pezhuheshi-ye imam Khomeini) which is controlled by Ayatollah Mesbah Yazadi, which accept only the seminary students, who wants to have academic educations as well.
Even before the revolution, the term “aqa zadeh” had a negative connotation, especially in seminary schools. As Fischer wrote, sons of the major religious leaders (aqazada) are almost invariably intellectually lazy and morally corrupt. They are at best functionaries in their fathers’ establishments and rarely become leaders in their own right; Fischer 2003, p 88) However, its connotations has dramatically worsened after the revolution. Right now Aqa zadeh has a very negative connotation. Many use it as use it as Parasite to describe the children of wealthy religious, and even political figures who without any expertise or qualification enjoying their life only because of their parents’ status (mainly father).
The Department of Statistics and Investigation is one of the deputy of “the Council for the Management of Seminaries” and consisted of clergy and non-clergy personnel. This department is like the Harasat in civilian organization, which collaborates with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security to control the staff. According to regulation 671, which was passed by the Supreme Council of the Seminary (showra-ye ali-ye Howzeh-ye Elmiyeh) in 2009, this office is responsible for reviewing the ideological and general qualification of seminary students and clergy. It is also responsible for moral, social and political control of clergy and surveillance, and collecting and analyzing the information and intelligence in seminaries. For more information, see http://www.shorayeaali.com/laws/law-content.aspx?id=248
There is limited information about the socio-economic background of seminary students in pre-revolution Iran. For example, according to Eric Hooglund, about 80 belonged to lower class or peasant families (Hooglund 1986, p 79–80). Fischer presented a more detailed statics of seminary students in which over half of seminary students at the Madrasa Golpayegani in Qom for example, were of rural background, about one-quarter were of clergy background; nearly as many were from the bazaar (Fischer 2003, p 78).
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Golkar, S. Clerical militia and securitization of seminary schools in Iran. Cont Islam 11, 215–235 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-017-0384-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-017-0384-8