Abstract
Autocracies pose a puzzle for students of constitutional politics. While it is tempting to brush constitutions aside as a sham, this chapter draws upon insights from various regions in the world to analyze the role of Belarus’ basic law beyond its failure to limit the government. Due to its information-related properties it contains a political vision and defines the nature of the political community, thus striving to shape the identity of its members. Referenda as the only means to adopt amendments attest to the lasting Soviet legacy and the populist nature of the regime. The de jure and de facto dominance of the presidency in the last two decades has entrenched the state’s discursive hegemony in the public sphere, and the rule-of-law rhetoric functions as a major claim to legitimacy.
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Notes
- 1.
The concept “semantic constitutions” goes back to Karl Loewenstein (1957) and refers to constitutions that to a certain degree correspond to political reality, but do not bind authoritarian rulers. For Max Weber’s concept “Scheinkonstitutionalismus”—variously translated as pseudo or sham constitutionalism—and the spread of this concept to the East, see Pipes (1955).
- 2.
I thank Petra Stykow, Caroline von Gall and the editors for insightful comments. All errors are my own.
- 3.
However, some authoritarian regimes do have a constitution that actually limits the government. An example of this is Chile under Pinochet. Barros (2002, 1–35) convincingly argued that the dictatorship in Chile was indeed an autocratic regime being bound by a constitution of its own making. This was possible because the military dictatorship was not personalist; but rather, power was organized collegially. Due to a plurality of actors within the authoritarian power bloc, institutional limits were effective. But as Belarus is a personalist regime no institutional limits on the incumbent are in place.
- 4.
Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (Bielaruskaja Savieckaja Sacyjalistyčnaja Respublika).
- 5.
After Paznjak had to go into exile in 1996, the BNF split up into two factions in 1999. While the Conservative Christian Party of the Belarusian Popular Front (Kanservatyvna-Hryscijanskaja Partija BNF—KHP-BNF) acknowledged Paznjak as its leader, another splinter party—Partjia BNF—formed around Vincuk Viačorka.
- 6.
The options were a weak president, a strong president, and no president at all.
- 7.
Arkadyev (2008) claims that the years between 1994 and 1996 had at least been an unsuccessful attempt at semi-presidentialism, but the subsequent elaboration will show that this was not the case.
- 8.
See the chapters on Poland and Romania in this volume.
- 9.
See the chapter on Russia in this volume.
- 10.
For constitution-making and referenda in democratic settings, see Blount, Elkins, and Ginsburg (2012, 50–58).
- 11.
The Party of Communists of Belarus (PKB) was founded in 1991 and registered as a party in May 1992 after the Soviet Communist Party of Belarus (Kommunističeskaja partija Belorussii—KPB) had been banned. The KPB ban was lifted in 1993 and on April 25, 1993 the merger of the two parties was decided in a joint congress. In the third congress, on December 17, 1994, the party was renamed into Belarusian Party of Communists in accordance with the new law on political parties, but due to the Russian name Partija Kommunistov Belorusskaja it could keep its abbreviation PKB. The impeachment initiative in mid-1996 eventually led to another split: The restored pro-presidential Communist Party of Belarus (KPB) formed in 1996 with 22 deputies willing to move from the Supreme Soviet into the non-elected House of Representatives—the lower chamber—while the PKB condemned their former comrades and declared their opposition to president Lukashenko (Feduta et al. 2003, 31ff.).
- 12.
For an overview of the amended articles, see the appendix. Uhl (1999, 205–207) correctly argues that the state commits to a strikingly detailed list of obligations towards the individual. But the main point here is not that the state might have a credibility crisis, as there is a high likelihood that it will fail to deliver on the promises. Even more so, Art. 2 explicitly states that the rights and their guarantees are goals rather than directly enforceable rights. Hence, the amendments have a signaling function and communicate that state interests are prevalent over those of the individual, and that the state will be the guiding actor in the economy rather than private enterprises.
- 13.
The index comprises 32 parliamentary powers with a total maximum score of 1 and a minimum score of 0.
- 14.
See Waldron (2013) for the dissection of the concept of separation of powers into separation, division and checks and balances.
- 15.
Islamist militants took hostage more than a thousand people in a school in North Ossetia in the North Caucasus. Beslan marked a watershed in Russia, not only due to the large number of victims and the threat of Islamist terror, but particularly due to a number of political reforms such as the abolition of gubernatorial elections.
- 16.
Applying Foucauldian discourse analysis, these three mechanisms were elaborated in detail in Jothie Rajah’s study on the “authoritarian rule of law” in Singapore (Rajah 2012).
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Appendix: Constitutional Politics in Belarus 1994–2014
Appendix: Constitutional Politics in Belarus 1994–2014
Dates of amendment and implementation | Articles | Constitutional subfields | Short analysis of the reform process |
|---|---|---|---|
05/14/1995/ 11/27/1996 | Art. 81, 94 | • Presidential powers | • Amendment by referendum (final vote: 77.7 % “yes”, 64.6 % of the electorate took part) • Result was only consultative, i.e. non-binding • Main actors: president with some support in the parliament and fierce opposition by national democratic deputies, constitutional court as veto player • Duration: about 1 month |
11/24/1996/ 11/27/1996 | Art. 2–3, 5–9, 13–14, 16–17, 21, 31–32, 34, 36–37, 42, 44–48, 51, 54, 59–61, 64, 66–67, 70–72, 74, 79–97, 99–101, 103–109, 111–112, 115–116, 119, 125–135, 137–149 | • Basic principles • Elections • Referendums • Executive • Legislative • Executive-legislative relations • Judiciary • Constitutional court • Local self-administration • Constitutional amendment provisions • Final and transitional provisions | • Amendment by referendum (final vote: 70.5 % “yes” presidential constitutional draft, 7.9 % “yes” parliamentary draft, 84.1 % of the electorate took part, presidential draft accepted) • Main actors: president as initiator, supported by the largest faction ‘Unity’ and parts of the communists; constitutional court was a major constraint (decision to declare referendum consultative, subsequently annulled by presidential decree) • Duration: about 4 months |
10/17/2004/ unclear | Art. 81 | • President | • Snap referendum (final vote: 88.9 % “yes”, 90.3 % of the electorate took part) • Main actors: president • Duration: about 1.5 months |
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Burkhardt, F. (2016). Belarus. In: Fruhstorfer, A., Hein, M. (eds) Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-13762-5_19
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