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Shapley Value

  • Chapter
Game Theory

Part of the book series: The New Palgrave

Abstract

The value of an uncertain outcome (a ‘gamble’, ‘lottery’, etc.) to a participant is an evaluation, in the participant’s utility scale, of the prospective outcomes: It is an a priori measure of what he expects to obtain (this is the subject of ‘utility theory’). In a similar way, one is interested in evaluating a game; that is, measuring the value of each player in the game.

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Authors
  1. Sergiu Hart
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Editor information

John Eatwell Murray Milgate Peter Newman

Copyright information

© 1989 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Cite this chapter

Hart, S. (1989). Shapley Value. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds) Game Theory. The New Palgrave. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20181-5_25

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