Regular ArticleThe Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring
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Cited by (97)
The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring
2023, Journal of Economic TheoryThe analogical foundations of cooperation
2023, Journal of Economic TheoryAccuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments
2020, Games and Economic BehaviorCitation Excerpt :These studies used the self-generative nature of perfect equilibria explored by Abreu (1988) and Abreu et al. (1990), which, however, crucially relied on the publicity of signal observations. In studying imperfect private monitoring, Ely and Välimäki (2002) and Piccione (2002) explored belief-free nature as an alternative to self-generation, which motivates a player to select both cooperative action and defective action at all times. These studies presented the folk theorem for prisoner's dilemma, wherein monitoring is private and almost perfect3 Based on this belief-free nature, Molander (1985), Nowak and Sigmund (1992), and Takahashi (2010) studied g-TFT strategies in various situations, such as biological populations and large communities with random matching.
Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring
2020, Journal of Economic TheoryWhat you get is what you see: Cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
2019, Journal of Economic TheoryInstability of belief-free equilibria
2017, Journal of Economic TheoryCitation Excerpt :These equilibria are called “belief-free” because a player’s belief about his opponent’s history is not needed to compute a best reply. Piccione (2002) and Ely and Välimäki (2002) present folk theorem results for the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma using belief-free equilibria under the assumptions that the monitoring technology is almost perfect and the players are sufficiently patient. Ely et al. (2005), Miyagawa et al. (2008), and Yamamoto (2009, 2014) extend the folk theorem results that rely on belief-free equilibria to general repeated games and to costly observability.
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I am grateful to Eddie Dekel, Stephen Morris, Sujoy Mukerji, Ariel Rubinstein, and two anonymous referees for their comments.